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INTRODUCTION

Often, a lawyer must exercise judgment in deciding whether a
client's proposed tax reporting position is legally supportable. In making this determination, the lawyer must achieve a balance between
excessive conservatism and reckless optimism. Through excessive conservatism, the lawyer might deprive the client of tax benefits*to which
the client is legally entitled, thereby failing to pursue the client's
interests with commitment and dedication within the bounds of the
law., If, however, the lawyer provides excessively optimistic tax advice, the lawyer risks breaching duties to both the client and the public.
The lawyer offering excessively optimistic advice risks exposing
the client to penalties for erroneous tax reporting. 2 The client may be
willing to accept this risk, thereby obviating any breach of the lawyer's
duty to the client. Nevertheless, by taking a legally insupportable
position, the lawyer may assist the client in escaping his or her rightful
share of taxation. The practical consequences of this action may extend
beyond the public's loss of tax revenue. If taxpayers generally perceive
that others are avoiding their proper shares of taxation, the overall
level of tax compliance may be eroded, reducing or eliminating the
effectiveness of a comprehensive income tax as a source of public
revenue.
For approximately thirty years, members of the legal and accounting professions, the Congress, and the Treasury have sought to reconcile the tax practitioner's often conflicting duties to the client and the
public. In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the American
Bar Association committee responsible for professional ethics said that

1.

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) ("A lawyer

should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law"). The drafters of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) replaced Canon 7's requirement of "zealous" representation with the requirement, in Model Rule 1.3, that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client." A comment to Rule 1.3 states further that
"[a] lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." For further discussion of the change in phraseology
(which was intended to clarify Canon 7's requirement of "zealous" representation rather than

to reflect any fundamental change in the lawyer's duty of commitment to the client's interests),
see infra note 74.

The drafters of the Model Rules also replaced the general requirement of Canon 7 that
lawyers remain "within the bounds of the law" with the somewhat more specific requirement
of Model Rule 1.2(d) that the lawyer "not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." For further discussion of this change, see
infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, see infra notes 99-115

and accompanying text.
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a lawyer can counsel a client to take a position provided it has "some
realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated." 3 In contrast,
the Treasury has proposed regulations 4 that could, in some circumstances, subject practitioners to discipline for assisting clients in
reporting positions not supported by "substantial authority" - a more
demanding standard than that adopted by the ABA. 5 Almost unanimously, practitioners have opposed the Treasury proposal, 6 and in
response the Treasury has agreed to a wide-ranging review of the
questions raised by its proposal before issuing final rules. 7
This article seeks to develop an analytical framework for understanding and resolving the controversy engendered by the Treasury
proposals. A determination of the scope of the lawyer's ethical duties
must depend first on identifying the bounds of the "law" governing
the conduct of the lawyer's client, the taxpayer, in the filing of returns.8
Identifying these bounds is difficult, because the "law" consists largely
of a body of civil penalties which may or may not place normative
obligations of compliance on the taxpayer.
But the resulting uncertainty concerning the taxpayer's normative
obligations, while complicating the task of defining the lawyer's ethical
obligations, also serves an important social purpose. It is precisely
the normative uncertainty of civil penalties that makes them useful
as instruments of regulation. By using civil penalties, the lawmaking
authority can control the incidence of behavior that involves social
cost, without taking the step, which may be undesirable on political,
economic, or normative grounds, of prohibiting the controlled behavior
entirely. Civil penalties are likely to be especially useful in the context
of taxation, where attempts to enforce the most demanding standards
of taxpayer compliance often are characterized by a high level of
normative ambivalence. For this reason, so long as there is an income

3.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), re-

printed in 39 TAx LAW. 631, 633 (1986).
4. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113 (1986) (proposed amendments to 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, Aug. 14, 1986),
amended for clerical corrections, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,510 (Aug. 27, 1986).

5. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., IRS Urged to Rewrite ProposalTying Ethics Standardfor Tax Return Preparers to Taxpayer UnderstatementPenalty, Daily Tax Report (BNA) K-1 (Feb. 24, 1987) [hereinafter IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal].

7. 51 Fed. Reg. 40,340 (1986) (proposed rulemaking amendments and solicitation of comments on 31 C.F.R. pt. 10; Nov. 6, 1986).

8.

The proper dependence of practitioner rules on the legal standards applying to taxpayers

is emphasized in Patterson, Tax Sheltersfor the Client - Ethics Sheltersfor the Lawyer (Book
Review), 61 TEx. L. REV. 1163 (1983). See also infra note 26.
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tax, it probably will be difficult to define the taxpayer's, and hence
the practitioner's, normative obligations under it.
The net effect of this situation is to counsel caution in the Treasury's
efforts to affect the level of tax compliance through the regulation of
practitioners. The general thrust of the Treasury's approach - to
conform the lawyer's ethical obligations to the tax code's penalty provisions - is correct. Nevertheless, the taxpayer penalty provisions
under the Code unambiguously proscribe only the most extreme forms
of taxpayer overreaching, and the disciplinary rules, accordingly, will
properly be able to prohibit practitioner assistance only in fairly egregious forms of misbehavior.
At present, it is not clear whether the Treasury's disciplinary regulations prohibit assistance in even this kind of manifestly antisocial
behavior, so that even limited regulations could achieve worthwhile
benefits. Congress and the Treasury could achieve some modest additional gains by refining certain of the civil penalties applying to taxpayers to establish more clearly the taxpayer's normative obligations.
This should enable the Treasury to issue somewhat more demanding
regulations governing practitioners.
Even after these steps are taken, however, it is likely that disciplinary constraints on tax practitioners will remain, to a surprising
extent, within the unregulated discretion of the practitioner. This need
not create serious difficulties, because penalties applied at the taxpayer
level, coupled with the limited level of practitioner regulation that is
possible, may be sufficient to achieve acceptable levels of compliance
in a self-assessed system. Perhaps the most important point, and one
that is of interest well beyond the confines of tax practice, is that the
intrinsic limits of practitioner regulation in controlling the behavior of
clients should be recognized, so that those forms of practitioner regulation that are appropriate can be designed most effectively.

II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ARTICULATE THE LAWYER'S
DUTY IN RENDERING TAx ADVICE
A.

Formal Opinion 314 and the "ReasonableBasis" Standard The Tax Return as an Adversarial Document

As the social importance and complexity of the income tax increased
following the Second World War, a substantial body of literature developed addressing the question of how "sure" a lawyer must be of a
client's legal position in order properly to assist the client in pursuing
that position in dealings with the Internal Revenue Service. Generally,
the debate centered on whether the tax lawyer, much like the lawyer
representing a client in litigation, was free to resolve in the client's
favor reasonable doubts concerning the validity of a position, or

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss5/2
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whether the lawyer was subject to a higher standard of disclosure in
making representations to tax authorities on the client's behalf.9 In
1965, in Formal Opinion 314,10 the ABA Ethics Committee" sought
to resolve this question in the contexts of both negotiating with the
IRS after a tax audit has begun, and formulating positions for clients
on tax returns yet to be filed.
The 1965 opinion began, without substantial analysis, by characterizing both situations as adversarial. Indeed, to the ABA committee
in 1965, the question was not whether statements made to the IRS
are adversarial in nature, but whether they are analogous to adver-

9. The early discussions generally addressed the question whether a lawyer in tax practice
faces special "public" duties not faced by practitioners in other situations. Much of the literature
is collected in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (B. Bittker ed.

1970). The earliest discussion in the collection, by Randolph Paul, describes the conflict faced
by the tax lawyer as follows:
There is [an] important respect in which tax law differs from other law. Its disputes
are not between private litigants, as in an action on a contract or in tort. The
controversies of tax law are between taxpayers and their government. This puts
the public interest into the equation and enormously complicates the responsibilities
of the tax adviser. He cannot safely act like an adviser in a completely private
dispute because he must allow for the breaks a sovereign government may receive
and also for his own special duty in the circumstances.
Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARv. L. REV. 377, 381-82 (1950), reprinted
in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, supra, at 1, 5-6 (footnote

omitted). See also Darrell, The Tax Practitioner'sDuty to his Client and his Government,
PRAC. LAW., Mar. 1961, at 23-24, reprintedin PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL
TAX PRACTICE, supra, at 131, 131-32 (in the context of tax practice, "certain social responsibilities should be added" to the obligations a lawyer faces in other circumstances).
Mark Johnson takes a contrary position in Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a Dual Responsibility to His Client and to the Government? - The Theory, 15 S. CAL. TAX INST. 25 (1963),
reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, supra, at 161
(B. Bittker ed. 1970) [hereinafter Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a Dual Responsibility?].
Johnson argues that public confidence in the tax system is enhanced if taxpayers believe that
they will receive effective representation from practitioners in dealings with the tax system.
This is best achieved, Johnson argues, if tax lawyers conform their behavior to the traditional
model of legal advocacy. "[Tihe undivided loyalty which the lawyer owes his client," Johnson
writes, 'isinconsistent with any reliance by the government upon his fiduciary obligation to
itself." Id. at 33.
For a useful review of the early literature, see Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client
That He May Take a Position on His Tax Return?, 29 TAx LAW. 237, 237-39 (1976).
10. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprintedin B. WOLFMAN
& J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 55-58 (2d ed. 1985).
11. The ABA changed the name of its Committee on Professional Ethics to the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in 1971. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Ethics Opinions 5-6 (1975). For a brief discussion of the
committee's origins, see C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.6 (1986). For convenience, this article refers to the committee simply as the 'Ethics Committee."
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sarial statements made before a court (in which case certain special
requirements of disclosure exist) or to statements made to an adversary outside of court, where the standard of disclosure is lower. 2
The opinion asked:
[S]ince the Service, however fair and impartial it may try
to be, is the representative of one of the parties, does the
lawyer owe it the same duty of disclosure which is owed to
the courts? Or is his duty to it more nearly analogous to
that which he owes his brother attorneys in the conduct of
cases which should be conducted in an atmosphere of candor
1
and fairness but are admittedly adversary in nature? 3
The committee determined that the Service is an adversary, not a
"true tribunal, ' 14 and that the lawyer's duties of disclosure in dealing
with it therefore are very limited.
The committee said that in negotiating with the Service in the
course of tax audits, as in all situations, the lawyer has an "absolute
duty not to make false assertions of fact." 15 Nevertheless, the committee viewed it as inevitable that in negotiations, "counsel will always
urge in aid of settlement of a controversy the strong points of his
case and minimize the weak." 16 The committee determined that proper
practice does not "require disclosure of weaknesses in the client's
case."17
12. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-106 (1980) ("In presenting
a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose... [llegal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to him to be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by
opposing counsel."); accord, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
Cf. also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1983) ("In an ex parte
proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.").
13. Formal Op. 314, supra note 10, at 671.
14. The committee said:
The Internal Revenue Service is neither a true tribunal, nor even a quasi-judicial
institution. It has no machinery or procedure for adversary proceedings before
impartial judges or arbiters, involving the weighing of conflicting testimony of
witnesses examined and cross-examined by opposing counsel and the consideration
of arguments of counsel for both sides of a dispute. While its procedures provide
for "fresh looks" through departmental reviews and informal and formal conference
procedures, few will contend that the Service provides any truly dispassionate and
unbiased consideration to the taxpayer. Although willing to listen to taxpayers and
their representatives and obviously intending to be fair, the Service is not designed
and does not purport to be unprejudiced and unbiased in the judicial sense.
Formal Op. 314, supra note 10, at 671.
15. Id. at 672.
16.

Id.

17.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss5/2
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According to the committee, the lawyer's responsibilities in return
preparation were based on principles identical to those applying in

negotiations during audit. Immediately following its discussion of the
lawyer's responsibilities in the cause of an audit, the opinion states:
Similarly, a lawyer who is asked to advise his client in
the course of the preparation of the client's tax returns may

freely urge the statement of positions most favorable to the
client just as long as there is reasonable basis for those

positions. Thus where the lawyer believes there is a reasonable basis for a position that a particular transaction does
not result in taxable income, or that certain expenditures
are properly deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty
to advise that riders be attached to the client's tax return
surrounding the transaction or
explaining the circumstances
8

the expenditures.'
The Ethics Committee based its conclusions, with respect to both
audit negotiation and return preparation, on the principles stated in
the ABA's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics 19 that legal representation must be carried out "within ... the bounds of the law," and that
the lawyer refrain from assisting the client in any "violation of law
or any manner of fraud or chicane."' To the authors of the opinion,

18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. The Canons of Professional Ethics constituted the ABA's disciplinary code from 1908
to 1969. In 1969, the ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
and in 1983 the ABA replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
While the ABA's ethical codes have no legal force of their own, they serve as models for
the disciplinary codes of the various states. Almost all states adopted a version of the Model
Code after its promulgation by the ABA in 1969. The Model Rules have been controversial
since their adoption by the ABA in 1983, primarily because of the very high value placed on
the confidentiality of client communications, even in many situations where the client contemplates criminal activity. As of this writing, half the states have adopted ethical codes based
in whole or in part on the Model Rules, often with significant amendments to the provisions
dealing with confidentiality.
The literature on the ABA's ethical compilations is very extensive. For a summary of the
rules in force in the different states (including descriptions of departures from the ABA model),
see Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 01:3-01:26 (1988). A brief review of the legal basis
for regulating the legal profession, with special emphasis on the regulation of tax practice, can
be found in B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE
26-30 (2d ed. 1985). A selective bibliography on problems of legal ethics can be found in the
same volume. Id. at 449-58. For recent overviews of the field, see Schneyer, MoralPhilosophy's
StandardMisconception ofLegal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529; Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral
EthicalRole: A Defense, A Problem,andSome Possibilities,1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
20. Formal Op. 314, supra note 10, at 671 (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS Canon 15 (1908)).
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the "bounds of law" governing return preparation apparently were
identical to those governing the lawyer's conduct in litigation. The
opinion recognized no considerations distinguishing the preparation of
a return from any other adversarial act.
As a number of commentators have pointed out, Formal Opinion
314 drew a flawed analogy between the submission of a return and
the statement of a position in an adversarial proceeding.21 The hallmark
of an adversarial proceeding, and a feature that plays an important
part in justifying a low standard of disclosure, is the presence of
opposing counsel who can be expected to scrutinize critically the
lawyer's statements. The chances that a tax return will be critically
scrutinized, however, are very low. The IRS audits only a small portion
of returns, less than two percent as of the 1980s.2 While enforcement
activity is likely to increase somewhat above current levels,2 the extent to which this can or should occur is limited.?' If an income tax
is to function efficiently, it must do so in the context of limited audit

21. See, e.g., Kurtz, Remarks to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Daily Tax Report (BNA) J-3 (May 26, 1977), reprintedin B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 59-62 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter Kurtz]; Patterson,

supra note 8,at 1169; Rowen, supra note 9, at 244-56.
22. In 1986 and 1987, the IRS maintained audit coverage of about 1.1 percent of individual
tax returns filed. Guttman, The Quantity and Quality of IRS Audits: Experts Agree Both Must
Improve, 39 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 162, 163 (1988) (summary of IRS data). The IRS
indicates its audit coverage annually in the Commissioner's Annual Report. Of course, a substantially higher proportion of returns likely to involve questionable legal positions - especially
returns of relatively high-income taxpayers - will be subject to audit. Nevertheless, even most
high-income taxpayers probably stand a relatively low chance of audit. See generally Kurtz &
Panel, Discussion on "Questionable Positions", 32 TAX LAw. 13, 15 (1978) (remarks of IRS
Commissioner Jerome Kurtz).
23. Guttman, supra note 22, at 164 (describing increases in IRS enforcement budget).
24. Greatly increased enforcement efforts could involve unacceptable interference with individuals' privacy interests. Cf. Miller, Tax Compliance Versus Individual Privacy: A Conflict
Between Social Objectives, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE -

A REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION
OF TAXATION INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 173 (P. Sawicki

ed. 1983).
In addition, the economic costs of enforcement could quickly become prohibitive. On this
topic, one text on public economics provides the followingThe question... is how far auditing and enforcement should be carried. Should
it be carried to the point where at the margin an additional dollar of cost brings
in less than a dollar of revenue? Hardly so, since the cost of administration is a
resource cost, whereas the gain is only a transfer. The marginal dollar of administration cost, therefore, has to be balanced against the value of more equitable
administration.
R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 290 (4th ed.

1984).
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coverage. As a practical matter, therefore, when a person takes a
questionable position on a tax return, "he or she may be effectively

'resolving' the disputed issue" in the taxpayer's favor.25
It is conceivable that the standard governing the lawyer's advice
in connection with tax returns should be similar to the standard applying in litigation. If that is the case, however, the result should not
be based upon a purported analogy between return filing and litigation.
Instead, the standard for return preparation must be found in the
6
particular "law" governing the return preparation process.
The Ethics Committee in 1965 in fact had a legal rationale available
for its "reasonable basis" standard which would have avoided the need

for an analogy between return preparation and litigation. The immediate impetus for promulgating an ethical opinion governing return
preparation came from the ABA's Section on Taxation, which had
established a Special Committee on Standards of Tax Practice in 1962.2

The Special Committee presented the Ethics Committee with three
hypothetical problems. Two of these involved questions arising in the

contexts of audit and litigation. A third, however, concerned a lawyer
facing, in connection with the preparation of a return, the often difficult
question whether a client had held real estate as an "investor" rather

than a "dealer," so that the client could exchange the property for
similar property on a tax-free basis.2 In posing the problem for the
Ethics Committee, the Tax Section committee stipulated that "[a]s
the attorney finds reasonablegrounds for the client to claim that [the]

25. Kurtz, supra note 21, at J-3.
26. "The measure of the lawyer's rights and duties in acting for the client are the client's
rights and duties under the law." Patterson, supra note 8, at 1175. Professor Patterson has
raised similar arguments more recently, in the context of a general treatment of legal ethics.
Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and Role of the Client,
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 43 (1987). See also Johnson, Tax Return Positions in Contempt of

Civil Penalties,33 TAX NOTEs (TAX ANALYSTS) 501, 501 (Nov. 3, 1986) ("A lawyer, accountant,
or other representative of the taxpayer steps into the shoes of the taxpayer, deriving his legal
duties from the taxpayer's duties."); Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a Dual Responsibility?,
supra note 9, at 25 ("[Ain understanding of the taxpayer's own obligations necessarily precedes
any analysis of his adviser's."). Indeed, Patterson writes that the dependence of the lawyer's
obligations on those of the client "is so obvious and simple that the real issue is why the rules
of ethics have not acknowledged it." Patterson, supranote 8, at 1175; see also infra notes 91-92
and accompanying text.
27. Report of the Special Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, BULL. ABA SEC.
TAX"N, July 1964, at 269; see generally Rowen, supranote 9, at 244-45; Nolan, Audit Coverage
and Private Tax Planning, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 425, 427-28 (1974).

28. Cf. I.R.C. § 1031(a) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of property
held for ... investment if such property is exchanged solely for property of like kind").
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exchange was tax-free, there are no problems involving possible pen-

alty provisions under the Code." 29
The "penalty provisions" mentioned by the Tax Section committee
were those of section 6653(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which

then imposed a five percent addition to tax for underpayments of tax
liability resulting in whole or in part from "negligence or intentional
'3
disregard of rules and regulations (but without intent to defraud)." 0
At the time Formal Opinion 314 was under consideration, section
6653(a) set forth the only statutory penalty directed at unsupported
positions on returns. Previous case law did, in fact, support the position
that the penalty would not be applied so long as a taxpayer had
3 1
"reasonable grounds" for the position taken on the return.

29. Report of the Special Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, supra note 27, at 270
(emphasis added).
30. In 1981, Congress amended § 6653(a) to add to the five percent (5%) penalty an additional
charge equal to one-half the statutory interest due on the underpayment. Economic Recovery
Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 722(b)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 342 (1981), adding I.R.C. § 6653(a)(2).
In 1986, Congress changed the language of I.R.C. § 6653(a) slightly. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1503(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2742. The penalty is now applied to underpayments
resulting in whole or in part from "negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations."
I.R.C. § 6653(a). For a discussion of the 1986 changes, see infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
31. See Burbank Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 999, 1010-1011 (1963); Senner
v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 655, 658 (1931). Since 1965, the Tax Court, probably influenced by
the language of Formal Opinion 314, has on occasion employed the phrase "reasonable basis"
to describe the standard applied under I.R.C. § 6653(a). See Grant v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
809, 827 (1985), affd, 800 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1986); Roundtree v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 151, 156 (1980). Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reversing a
decision of the Tax Court, held that where a taxpayer takes a position in direct contravention
of an I.R.S. regulation, a "reasonable basis" argument that the regulation is invalid will not
suffice to avoid the § 6653(a) penalty. Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983), affg in part and rev'g in part 77 T.C. 867 (1981). The Tax
Court apparently considers the question raised in Druker as remaining open. See Grant, 84
T.C. at 827 n.28 (dictum). Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the issue raised in Druker,
there seems little doubt that a "reasonable basis" standard has applied in most circumstances
under I.R.C. § 6653(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(4), discussed infra note 36 (regulation,
in interpreting "return preparer" penalty which is similar to that of I.R.C. § 6653(a), explicitly
applies "reasonable basis" standard).
To a large extent, the development of a "reasonable basis" standard under § 6653(a) seems
to have resulted from usage among practitioners, rather than from careful judicial analysis.
There is, indeed, very little authority providing useful guidance as to the boundaries of the §
6653(a) penalty, apparently because the Service normally has asserted the penalty only where
a taxpayer's position is utterly without support. See generally Asimow, Civil Penaltiesfor
Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 UCLA L. REV. 637, 650 (1976) (IRS typically has
applied negligence penalty to conduct which is "reckless or intentional"); Harris, Assessment of
Penalties Under Section 6653: Taxpayer Positions Contraryto IRS Rules and Regulations, 38
TAX EXEC. 147, 151 (1986); Hoffman, Intentional Disregardof Rules and Regulations, 28
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The Ethics Committee's apparent decision not to refer explicitly
to section 6653(a) in its opinion, but rather to ground its "reasonable
basis"-2 standard on portions of the ABA Canons applying to lawyers
in their adversarial role, probably reflected a desire, reportedly expressed by at least some participants in deliberations over legal ethics
in the 1960s, that tax practice not be subject to constraints different
from those applying to lawyers generally.w The committee's decision

TAXEs 111 (1950). The sparsity of "close" cases under I.R.C. § 6653(a) may reflect an IRS
practice of using the section's penalty primarily as a "bargaining chip" in audit settlement
negotiations, and of insisting on imposition of the penalty only in cases of fairly extreme misconduct. Cf. Interview With [IRS] Chief Counsel William F. Nelson, 33 TAx NOTES (TAX
ANALYSTS) 888, 889 (Dec. 8,1986).
For consideration of the possibility that the standard applied by the courts under § 6553(a)
might be raised as a result of recent legislative changes, see infra notes 171-73 and accompanying
text.
32. The use, in Formal Opinion 314, of "reasonable basis" instead of the Tax Section committee's "reasonable grounds" may reflect language used in Mark Johnson's 1963 discussion of
tax practitioners' ethics, Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a Dual Responsibility?, supra note 9.
Johnson, in advocating a standard for return preparation similar to that applying generally to
the legal advocate, said:
Surely, we must give our client the benefit of all reasonable doubts on the facts
and the law. We of course should communicate to him our expert evaluation of all
reasonable doubts, so that he will be prepared for all contingencies. But, once we
are honestly convinced that he has a reasonablebasis for an advantageous position,
we can counsel and advocate that position without first satisfying ourselves that
we would accept that position if we were a revenue agent.
Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added). See Rowen, supranote 9, at 238-39 (discussing Johnson's contribution in the context of a review of Formal Opinion 314).
Participants in discussions concerning the ABA opinion may also have been influenced by
language employed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which had been
engaged in its own discussion of ethical standards for tax return advice. In August 1963, an
AICPA ethics committee had provided:
In tax practice, a member ...must observe the same standards of truthfulness
and integrity as he is required to observe in any other professional work. This
does not mean, however, that a member ... may not resolve doubt in favor of
his client as long as there is reasonablesupport for his position.
AICPA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 13, reprinted in Blake, Statements on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice,J. AccT., Apr. 1964, at 37, 38. Cf. infra note 34.
33. One commentary reports that when the ABA began work on drafting the 1969 Code
of Professional Responsibility, "the Chairman of the ABA Tax Section's Committee on Standards
of [Tax] Practice inquired of the Tax Section Committee whether the revision of the Canons of
Ethics should provide special rules for tax lawyers. Such survey found the Committee overwhelmingly opposed to such an approach." Collie & Marinis, Ethical Considerationson Discovery of
Errors in Tax Returns, 22 TAx LAW. 455, 460 n.16 (1969). Cf. Note, Ethical Problems and
Responsibilities of the Tax Attorney, 66 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 115 (1964) ("Generally speaking,
the ethical problems facing a tax attorney in dealing with the Service are the same as those of
any lawyer dealing with an adversary.").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

11

Florida Law
Review, LAW
Vol. 39,
Iss. 5 [1987],
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
REVIEW

Art. 2

[Vol. 39

had no significant practical consequences in 1965, because the legal

standards governing taxpayer behavior, based on section 6653(a), coincided closely with the ethical rules governing lawyer conduct in adversarial proceedings. The committee's approach nevertheless is based

on a faulty analysis, which has hampered development of the law of
professional responsibility as public perceptions concerning taxpayer
responsibilities have changed.
B.

Code Section 6661 and the Challenge to the
"Reasonable Basis" Standard

Notwithstanding the defect in its rationale, Formal Opinion 314
conformed the practitioner's ethical standard to the obligations of the
client under section 6653(a), and the "reasonable basis" standard appears to have enjoyed widespread acceptance in the fifteen-year period
following the opinion's release.- In 1976, responding to perceptions of
overreaching by paid income tax preparers, Congress enacted section
6694 of the Internal Revenue Code, imposing a penalty of $100 per

violation on preparers assisting in returns evidencing "negligent or
intentional disregard of rules and regulations. ' The Treasury's regulations under the new penalty explicitly incorporated a "reasonable
36
basis" standard.
Several commentators report that members of the ABA Tax Section and the Ethics Committee engaged in active discussion while Formal Opinion 314 was under consideration, but that
no detailed records of either the Ethics Committee's or the Tax Section's discussions were kept.
B. BITrKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 71-72 (1965)

(bibliographic appendix to text of Ford Distinguished Lecture delivered at New York University);
Rowen, supra note 9, at 244-45. Professor B. Bittker, deploring the absence of documentation
of the ABA's deliberations in 1965, compares the status of the deliberations underlying Formal
Opinion 314 to that of an "unperson" in George Orwell's novel 1984 (1949). B. BITTKER, supra,
at 71.
34. During this period, the AICPA employed an essentially identical "reasonable support"
standard for return preparation, based on its ethics committee's Opinion No. 13, from 1963. See
supra note 32. The AICPA and its tax division restated its "reasonable support" standard in
several pronouncements during the 1970s. See generally Podolin, Treasury Raises the Stakes
in Circular 230 Proposal, J. AcoT., Apr. 1988, at 60, 61 (summarizing history of AICPA
pronouncements). The AICPA recently has been engaged in a reevaluation of the language of
its ethical guidelines, in order to achieve consistency with the ABA's recently adopted standard
of "some realistic possibility of success" in ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, supra note 3. See
Podolin, supra, at 61.
35. The penalty under § 6694 applies to all persons who prepare income tax returns for
compensation. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (defining "income tax return preparer"). Federal law
does not require that paid preparers possess any professional qualifications.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(4) provides:
If a preparer in good faith and with reasonable basis takes the position that a
rule or regulation does not accurately reflect the Code and does not follow it, the
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By the late 1970s, however, amid increasing official concern with
what was perceived as inadequate tax compliance, the Treasury began
to question the adequacy of the "negligence" penalty of Code section
6653(a). Speaking in 1977, IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz argued
that the relatively low level and lenient standard of the penalty encour-

aged participation in an "audit lottery" in which taxpayers stated
extremely aggressive positions in returns in the hope of nondetection
by the Service.3 Kurtz proposed augmentation of section 6653(a) with

a new requirement of disclosure of "questionable" positions, presumably backed by a penalty for nondisclosure, as well as a reexamination
of the '"negligence or intentional disregard" standard.m
In 1982, in response to Kurtz's and similar proposals,a Congress
enacted a new penalty in section 6661 of the Code. 40 This provision
imposes an addition to tax, originally set at ten percent and increased
to twenty-five percent in 1986, on "substantial understatements" of

tax liability.41 To qualify as "substantial," an understatement must

preparer has not negligently or intentionally disregarded the rule or regulation.
This test shall be applied in the same manner as it is applied under section 6653(a)
and the regulations thereunder (relating to disregard of rules and regulations by
taxpayers). For example, if a preparer reasonably takes the position in good faith
that a revenue ruling does not accurately reflect the Code, the preparation of a
return or claim for refund by the preparer in conflict with the revenue ruling is
not a negligent or intentional disregard of the revenue ruling.
Id. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 355 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3439, 3784 (preparer penalty 's...
to be interpreted in a manner similar
to the interpretation given [I.R.C. § 6653(a)]").
In Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 53-55 (2d Cir. 1982), the court held that this
regulation under I.R.C. § 6694(a) did not preclude the Service from asserting a penalty under
§ 6653(a) for the intentional disregard of a regulation, even where the position that the regulation
was invalid was supported by a "reasonable basis." This view has been criticized. See Harris,
supra note 31, at 151.
37. Kurtz, supra note 21, passim.
38. Id. at J-3, J-4.
39. For antecedents to Commissioner Kurtz's proposal, see Administrative Conference of
the United States, Recommendation 75-77, 41 Fed. Reg. 3984 (1976), reprinted in Asimow,
supra note 31, at 686-88; Nolan, supra note 27, at 430.
40. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 323(a), 96 Stat. 324, 613-15 (1982), amended, Pub. L. No. 97-354,
§ 5(a)(42), 96 Stat. 1669, 1697 (1982); amended, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 714(h)(3), 98 Stat. 494,
962 (1984); amended, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 8002(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 1951 (1986); amended, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 1504(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2743 (1986). The legislative history of I.R.C. § 6661
is discussed infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
41. The 1986 increase in the penalty to 25% will apply even to positions taken on returns
before the increase was enacted. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-509, § 8002(b), 100 Stat. 1874, 1951; IRS Info. Release 86-149 (Nov. 6, 1986), reprinted in
Daily Tax Report (BNA) G-3 (Nov. 7, 1986). This retroactivity has evoked controversy. See,
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exceed the greater of $5,000 or ten percent of the tax liability that
properly should have been shown in the return.4 Thus, the penalty
normally will apply only to relatively wealthy taxpayers.
Section 6661 provides generally that its penalty will not apply to
'the tax treatment of any item by the taxpayer if there is or was
substantialauthorityfor such treatment" or to "any item with respect
to which the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are
adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the
return." The opportunity to avoid the penalty by disclosure is designed to limit application of the penalty to those situations in which
taxpayers seek to exploit the likelihood that their positions,4 5even if
questionable, will not be discovered by the Service on audit.

e.g., Uhlfelder, Commissioners Advisory Group Considers Penalties,InternationalTaxation,
and Electronic Filing, 33 TAx NoTEs (TAx ANALYSTS) 1091, 1092 (Dec. 22, 1986).
On September 25 and 27, 1986, the House and Senate, respectively, approved the conference
version of § 1504(a) of H.R. 3838, the Tax Reform Bill of 1986, which would have raised the § 6661
penalty from 10% to 20%. Later, on October 17, 1986, both houses aproved the conference
version of H.R. 5300, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, which repealed the change
to 20% and increased the penalty instead to 25%. On October 21, however, the President first
signed the Budget Reconciliation Act (Pub. L. No. 99-509), which raised the penalty to 25%,
and one day later signed the Tax Reform Act (Pub. L. No. 99-514), which would have raised
the penalty to 20%. See generally Pallottiniv. Commissioner, 90 T.C. No. 35 (Mar. 30, 1988)
(describing legislative history). To preclude any interpretation that the ultimate result of these
actions was to increase the penalty to 20%, § 115(e) of the Technical Corrections Bill of 1988
would treat the increase to 25% as if it had been enacted after the 1986 Reform Act's increase
to 20%. H.R. 4333 (as introduced Mar. 31, 1988). See generally Staff of the Jt. Comm. on
Taxation, Description of the Technical Corrections Act of 1988 (Comm. Print 1988) at 372. The
Tax Court, in Pallottini, supra, already has reached a similar result, based on principles of
statutory interpretation..
42. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1)(A). For corporate taxpayers, the minimum threshold of a "substantial" understatement is $10,000, not $5,000. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1)(B).
43. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Section 6661 requires that the taxpayer
believe that a position is '"more likely than not" to succeed, a standard more demanding than
"substantial authority," if the penalty is to be avoided with respect to a "tax shelter" for purposes
of § 6661. To constitute a "tax shelter" for purposes of § 6661, an avoidance scheme generally
must involve patently dishonest behavior such as overvaluing assets to support artificially large
depreciation deductions. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-5(b)(1). The definition of 'tax shelter" employed
for purposes of § 6661 is thus narrower than that employed in other contexts. Cf. I.R.C. § 6111
(for purposes of rules requiring sellers of "tax shelter" investments to furnish certain information
to IRS, 'tax shelter" is defined generally as any investment likely to generate tax losses). The
special 'tax shelter" rules of § 6661 are unlikely to be applicable to "routine" questionable
reporting positions of the kind addressed in this article. For further discussion of questions
associated with 'tax shelters," see infra note 81.
44. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(ii).
45. Disclosure of a position will not avoid imposition of the penalty if an understatement
is caused by an item related to a 'tax shelter." I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(I).
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The congressional committee reports to section 6661 state that the
"substantial authority" standard is to be less stringent than a "more likely than not" standard
and more stringent than a "reasonable basis" standard. Thus,
it is anticipated that this new standard will require that a
taxpayer have stronger support for position than a mere
"reasonable basis" (a reasonable basis being one that is argua complete
able, but fairly unlikely to prevail in court upon
46
authority).
and
facts
relevant
the
of
review
The new provision thus unmistakably subjects to penalties some reporting positions in which a lawyer would, under Formal Opinion 314,
be free to assist.
Following the enactment of section 6661, the ABA Tax Section
47
began discussion of proposals for revision of Formal Opinion 314.
Participants in the discussion, who were by then well aware of criticisms of the analogy between return preparation and litigation set
forth in Formal Opinion 314, began with the assumption that the
attorney's ethical rules should be based on the taxpayer penalty provisions of the code. Nevertheless, proposals to base an ethical standard directly on section 6661 were arrested at an early stage of development.
The foreshortening of the debate resulted not so much from dissatisfaction with the "substantial authority" standard per se as from
vehement disagreement with the Treasury's interpretation of section
6661. Most importantly, the Treasury declined in its regulations under
section 6661 to recognize IRS private letter rulings as "authority" for
purposes of the "substantial authority" test.49 The Service issues pri46. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 575, reprinted in 1982
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1347.

U.S. CODE

47. Prior to the enactment of § 6661, in the very early 1980s, members of the Tax Section
had discussed possible revision of the "reasonable basis" standard in connection with the drafting
of rules governing lawyers' representations in publicly marketed 'tax shelter" investment offer-

ings. Letter from Paul J. Sax to Michael C. Durst (Jan. 25, 1988) (describing history of ABA
concern with "reasonable basis" standard); see generallyinfra note 81 (describing ABA and IRS

activities connected with tax shelter offerings). Ultimately, the leadership of the Tax Section
decided to defer consideration of the "reasonable basis" standard pending completion of an ethical
opinion dealing with public offerings of tax shelters. Letter from Paul J. Sax to Michael C.
Durst, supra. Following the release of an ethical opinion dealing with tax shelters in 1982 (see
infra note 72), the Tax Section resumed discussion of the "reasonable basis" standard in 1983.

Id. By that time, of course, the enactment of § 6661 strongly influenced discussions concerning
ethical standards for tax return advice.
48. Holden, New ProfessionalStandards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 814, 346, and
Circular230, 4 VA. TAx REV. 209, 238-40 (1985).
49.

Id. at 239-40; cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b).
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vate letter rulings in response to requests from taxpayers for guidance
in planning specific transactions. The rulings are binding on the Service
only with respect to the taxpayers requesting them, and the Code
states that they cannot be cited by others as precedent. 50 The rulings
are nevertheless made available to the public by commercial publishers
and provide important guidance to practitioners, especially on questions not addressed by regulations or officially published "revenue
rulings." Dissatisfaction with the Treasury's exclusion of private rulings from the definition of "authority" was sufficiently intense to
render unlikely the ABA's use of section 6661 as a basis for its ethical
guidelines. 51
Despite rejection of the "substantial authority" standard, discussions
within the Tax Section elicited agreement that the reasonable basis
standard, grounded in the analogy between return submission and the
statement of a position in litigation, no longer adequately defined a
lawyer's professional obligations. Accordingly, the Tax Section proposed to the ABA Ethics Committee a draft revision of Formal Opinion
314 which attempted to establish a standard more demanding than
52
"reasonable basis" but less demanding than "substantial authority."
The Tax Section draft stated explicitly that "[a] tax return is not
a submission in an adversary proceeding." 53 The lawyer's obligations
in return preparation, the draft held, did not derive from considerations peculiar to litigation but rather from the general requirement,
set forth in the ABA's ethical code, that lawyers state arguments on
behalf of clients in "good faith." 4 The draft concluded that in the
context of tax return advice, in order for the lawyer to assist a client
in taking a position the position must be a meritorious one. A position is
meritorious if it is advanced in good faith, as evidenced by
a practical and realistic possibility of success, if litigated.
In the absence of controlling judicial authority, a position is

50. I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3); cf. Portney, Letter Rulings: An EndangeredSpecies?, 36 TAx LAW.
751, 755 (1983) (arguing that to accord letter rulings precedential value would place an excessive
burden of review on the Service).
51. See Holden, supra note 48, at 239-40.
52. ABA Section of Taxation, Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314 (May 21, 1984),
reprinted in B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 71-74

(2d ed. 1985).
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 72-73. The requirement of "good faith" is stated in Model Rules 1.2(d) and 3.1.
Cf. infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss5/2

16

Durst: The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility

TAX LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1043

meritorious if it is supported by a sound construction of the
applicable statutory provision even though another construction ultimately may prevail. A position is not meritorious,
however, if it is advanced principally to exploit the audit
selection process, a mere "arguing" position advanced solely
to obtain leverage in the bargaining process of settlement
negotiations, a position that would serve merely to avert a
successful charge that the return is false or fraudulent, or
a position that has no practical and realistic possibility of
being sustained in the courts. 5
The Tax Section draft made clear, however, that a position could be
"meritorious" without meeting the "substantial authority" test.5 The
draft stated that if the lawyer believed a position could, if challenged
by the Service, be subject to the "substantial authority" penalty, the
lawyer should advise the client to disclose the position on the return. 57
Nevertheless, if the client declined to disclose the position, the lawyer
could continue to provide assistance so long as the position was
"meritorious."5
While the Tax Section draft properly sought to end the equation
of the tax return with a submission in an adversarial proceeding, the
attempt to create a standard without reference to either section 6653(a)
or section 6661 inevitably would have created a divergence between
the obligations of practitioners and those of their clients. If the "reasonable basis" standard, by reference to section 6653(a), defines the obligations of taxpayers, then the Tax Section draft would have subjected
the lawyer to discipline for assisting taxpayers in formulating return
positions which the taxpayers were legally entitled to take. If, alternatively, the "substantial authority" standard of section 6661 defines the
taxpayer's obligations, then the Tax Section draft, by setting a less
demanding standard for lawyers, would have authorized practitioners
to assist taxpayers in violating their legal obligations. Either result
would have been inconsistent with the lawyer's role.
The Tax Section referred its draft to the ABA Ethics Committee,
which issued Formal Opinion 85-352, a successor to Formal Opinion
314, in July 1985.59 The Ethics Committee began Formal Opinion 85-352

55. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 73-74.
57. Id. at 73.
58. Id. at 73-74.
59. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 85-352 (1985),
reprintedin 39 TAx LAW. 631 (1986).
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with an apparently reluctant acknowledgment of reasons for reviewing
the "reasonable basis" standard of Formal Opinion 314. The new opinion
states:
The Committee is informed that the standard of "reasonable basis" has been construed by many lawyers to support
the use of any colorable claim on a tax return to justify
exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection
process. This view is not universally held, and the Committee
does not believe that the reasonable basis standard, properly
interpreted and applied, permits this construction.
However, the Committee is persuaded that as a result
of serious controversy over this standard and its persistent
criticism by distinguished members of the tax bar, IRS officials and members of Congress, sufficient doubt has been
created regarding the validity of the standard so as to erode
its effectiveness as an ethical guideline. For this reason, the
0
Committee has concluded that it should be restated.
The Ethics Committee also observed that the ABA had, since 1965,
issued two successors to the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics on
which Formal Opinion 314 had been based, and that both the 1969
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the 1983 Model Rules
of Professional Conduct "address the duty of a lawyer in presenting
or arguing positions for a client in language that does not refer to
'
'reasonable basis.' 61
While accepting the need to change the language of Formal Opinion
314, however, the new opinion does not change its basic rationale.
The Ethics Committee pointedly did not adopt the Tax Section's proposed statement that "[a] tax return is not a statement in an adversary
proceeding." Indeed, Formal Opinion 85-352 finds it unnecessary to
characterize the filing of a return as either adversarial or nonadversarial. The opinion states that "[a]lthough the Model Rules distinguish
between the roles of advisor and advocate, both roles are involved
here, and the ethical standards applicable to them provide relevant
''
guidance. 62
While the Ethics Committee distinguishes between the roles of
advocate and adviser, its analysis in Formal Opinion 85-352 leads it
to a standard that, functionally, seems very close to the "reasonable
basis" standard that it replaces. The Ethics Committee refers in its

60. Id. at 631 (footnote omitted).
61.

Id. at 631-32.

62. Id. at 632 (footnote omitted).
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opinion to Model Rule 3.1, which prohibits advocates from stating
positions "unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law."63 With respect to the responsibilities of
advisers, the committee refers to Model Rule 1.2(d), which the committee says "applies to representation generally."6 This rule states
that it is impermissible for a lawyer to counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client
to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law.6
The committee might, at this point, have inquired into the meaning
of the requirement that lawyers refrain from assisting clients in "criminal or fraudulent" activity. This inquiry almost certainly would have
led the committee to examine the penalty provisions of the tax code
which regulate taxpayers' return positions. Instead, the opinion focuses
on the similar phrases in Rules 3.1 and 1.2(d) authorizing both the
advocate and adviser to assist clients in making "good faith" efforts
to challenge prevailing interpretations of law.6 The authors of Formal
Opinion 85-352, like the authors of the Tax Section draft, viewed the
problem before them as one of defining "good faith" within the context
of filing a tax return. Formal Opinion 85-352 states that in the context
of return preparation, "good faith requires that there be some realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated." 67 The Tax Section's

"practical and realistic possibility" thus bcame "some realistic possibility."
Like the Tax Section draft, Formal Opinion 85-352 indicates that
a lawyer should advise the client whether a proposed position might
be subject to the penalty under section 6661. The opinion states that
this is called for by the lawyer's obligation of "competent representation of the client.

' 69

Provided that a position has "some realistic

63. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983)).
64. Id. at 632.
65. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983)).
66. See id. at 632-33.
67.

Id. at 633.

68.
69.

Id.
Id.
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possibility of success if the matter is litigated," however, Formal Opinion 85-352 says that the lawyer may assist the client in taking the
position even if it would subject the client to the penalty under section
6661.0
Since the release of Formal Opinion 85-352, a committee of the
ABA Tax Section has argued that "some realistic possibility of success"
is intended to create a standard more demanding than that applying
to advocates in litigation.' The opinion's omission of the Tax Section's
proposed statement that tax returns do not constitute submissions in
adversarial proceedings, however, as well as the opinion's change from
'practical and realistic possibility" to "some realistic possibility,"
suggest that if the Ethics Committee did intend a strengthening of
the standard, the change was to be modest. On the whole, the opinion
seems to reaffirm the view of the return as an adversarial document. 72
By retaining a standard similar to that applying to advocates in
litigation, Formal Opinion 85-352 maintains a rough congruence be-

70.

Id.

71. A committee appointed by the Tax Section leadership to evaluate Formal Op. 85-352
concluded:
[T]he new standard requires not only that there be some possibility of success, if
litigated, rather than merely a construction that can be argued or that seems
reasonable, but also that there be more than just any possibility of success. The
possibility of success, if litigated, must be "realistic." A possibility of success cannot
be "realistic" if it is only theoretical or impractable [sic]. This clearly implies that
there must be a substantial possibility of success, which when taken together with
the assumption that the matter will be litigated, measurably elevates what had
come to be widely accepted as the minimum ethical standard.
Sax, Holden, Tannenwald, Watts, & Wolfinan, Report of the Special Task Force on Formal
Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAw. 635, 638 (1986).

72.

One recent commentary concludes:
It is not clear whether the "good faith belief" standard [which the authors of
Formal Opinion 85-352 stated required "some realistic possibility of success"]
changes or simply rewords the "reasonable basis" standard. In either event, Opinion
352 represents the ABA's deliberate decision not to take visible action to raise the
ethical standard for tax advice.
Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion85-352,
39 TAX LAw. 643, 644-45 (1986). Similarly, a leading text in federal taxation concludes:
Formal Opinion 85-352 relies heavily upon the premise that the filing of a tax
return "may be the first step in a process that may result in an adversary relationship between the client and the IRS." As such, the Opinion applies to tax return
advice the standards generally applicable to bringing or defending law suits.
S. SURREY, P. McDANIEL, H. AULT, & S. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 45

(Successor ed. 1986). See generally Note, Formal Opinion 352: ProfessionalIntegrity and the
Tax Audit Lottery, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1987) (arguing that Formal Opinion 85-352
inappropriately retains view of tax return as adversarial document).
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tween the lawyer's ethical standards and the taxpayer penalty under
section 6653(a). This congruence, however, is based on an essentially
uncritical adoption of standards designed to govern lawyers in their
adversarial role. Formal Opinion 85-352 gives no reason why the
lawyer's obligations in filing a return for a client should be defined
by the same rules the ABA has prescribed to govern lawyer conduct
in litigation. The opinion does not address the practical argument that
return submission and litigation occur in greatly different factual contexts, and that a rule appropriate for litigation may very well not be
appropriate for return preparation.
The Ethics Committee's fundamental error in drafting Formal
Opinion 85-352, as in drafting Formal Opinion 314 twenty years before,
consisted of a failure to recognize both the centrality of the ethical
requirement that lawyers represent their clients within the bounds of
law, and the relatively narrow purpose of the specific ethical rules
governing lawyers' conduct in litigation.7 The rule that lawyers are
to represent their clients' interests with commitment and dedication,
but within the bounds of the law, occupies a special and fundamental
position in legal ethics. 74 This rule not only regulates the legal profes-

73. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
74. Canon 7 of the ABA's 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility provided: "A
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." The drafters of the

1983 Model Rules did not incorporate the term "zealous representation" in the text of the rules
themselves, providing instead in Rule 1.3 that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.3 (1983). The word "zeal" is relegated to the official comment to Rule 1.3, which points to
the lawyer's duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and

with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." Id.
In eliminating the requirement of "zealous" representation from the text of the rules, the
drafters did not intend to eliminate from the Rules the import of former Canon 7, but rather
sought to avoid the possibility that the phrase "zealous representation" might be misinterpreted

to require a level of aggressiveness inconsistent with the lawyer's accepted role in many situations:
One [concern] was that "zealousness" might be interpreted to mean "zealotry,"
thereby justifying wrongful lawyer conduct if it aided a client. A second was that

"zeal" might imply a requirement of personal involvement rather than professional
commitment. A third objection pointed to the lack of fit between "zealousness"

and the proper character of representation in certain non-adversary situations,
such as in-office counseling.
Despite these criticisms, the formulation in Canon 7 of "zealously within the
bounds of the law" came to have a sound and relatively definite meaning. Overzealousness was precluded by the general requirement of acting within lawful bounds
and by the specific prohibitions in many of the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 7.

Although the Code as a whole did not address non-adversary situations as fully as
it should have, "zeal" in such contexts was properly understood to mean effectiveness, creativity, and attention to detail.
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sion but also defines it. The lawyer's function is to enable his or her
clients to pursue their legal rights. To the extent that a person is
legally entitled to pursue a desired course of action, whether to institute a particular lawsuit or to take a particular position on a tax
return, that person is entitled to the assistance of counsel. If, however,
a person seeks to take a course of action that is not legally permissible,
that person has no legitimate claim to legal representation. Indeed, the
lawyer would serve an antisocial purpose by providing representation,
and the ethical codes prohibit the lawyer from doing so. It is fair to
say that the rule requiring dedicated representation, but only within
the bounds of law, applies to every activity engaged in by the lawyer.
Other portions of the ethical codes serve a more limited purpose.
These set forth essentially technical rules governing specific activities
in which lawyers tend to engage. Thus, for example, the codes typically
contain detailed rules governing fee negotiations between lawyers and
clients,75- the advertising of legal services, 76 and the safekeeping of
clients' property.77 These specific rules represent manifestations of the

The Official Comment to Rule 1.3 makes clear that the term "diligence" is
meant to continue these interpretations. The Comment refers to "zeal" as the
lawyer's appropriate mode in litigation, while "commitment and dedication" describe
the lawyer's professionalism in other contexts.
G.

HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES

(1986).
The lawyer's duty to further the client's interests is, of course, subject to some qualifications
in addition to the requirement that representation remain within the bounds of law. Lawyers
are virtually never required to commence representation which they find repugnant, and in
many instances they are permitted to withdraw from representation once begun. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983). Indeed, substantial components of the
ethical code are devoted to protecting the lawyer against some of the more extreme psychological
pressures that might arise if the lawyer were required to persist in representing the client in
all instances, without regard to the lawyer's own sensibilities. See generally Schneyer, supra
note 19, passim.
75. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1983). An agreement for a contingent fee
[s]hall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the
event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted
from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after
the contingent fee is calculated.
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 47-48

Id.

76.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules

7.2, 7.4 (1983).

77. Id. 1.15.
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general rule requiring lawyers to operate within the bounds of law.
Indeed, these specific rules identify the "bounds of law" governing
particular aspects of the lawyer's practice. They perform this function
in the same way that a state's health code might establish the "bounds
of law" for restaurant owners, or the provisions of the state's electrical
code might establish the "bounds of law" for electricians.
The rules governing lawyers' conduct in litigation are among the
rules governing specific activities in which lawyers engage. They are
placed in the rules of legal ethics simply because the technical aspects
of litigation are almost exclusively the province of lawyers. But despite
their placement in what are commonly called the ethical codes, they
are not really "ethical" rules in the sense that they set forth principles
applicable to a wide range of activities. They are rules of limited
application, governing a specific activity.
The ABA's opinions on return preparation treat these specialized
rules governing litigation as ethical principles of widespread application
and thus apply them in a context for which they were not designed.78
At the same time, the opinions forgo the opportunity to examine the
properly applicable ethical rule, that lawyers may provide representation only within the bounds of the law, and to consider that rule's
implications in tax practice. The Ethics Committee has as yet provided
no guidance on the central question of what constitutes the "law"
governing the preparation of returns.
C.

The Treasury Proposal

On August 14, 1986, in apparent response to Formal Opinion 85352, the Treasury proposed its own rules governing practitioner assistance in filing returns .r The Treasury acted under its statutory author80 If adopted, the
ity to regulate practitioners appearing before it.

78.

The tendency to treat rules governing advocacy as general principles of "legal ethics"

is -

a product of history, for the early codes of ethics, direct antecedents of the current
Code, were drafted at a time when the lawyer's premier, if not only, role was

perceived as that of an advocate in the judicial process; consequently the codes
reflected only this role and this process.
Patterson, supra note 8, at 1168.

The "ethical" rules governing positions put forward in litigation are, essentially, restated in
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a body of "law" applicable to attorneys and
pro se litigants alike.
79. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, supra note 4.
80. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (1982 & Supp. 1985) authorizes the Treasury to suspend or disbar

representatives who are "incompetent" or "disreputable," or who "violate regulations." One
commentary has argued that the Treasury's authority to promulgate regulations under this
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proposed rules would constitute amendments to part 10 of title 31 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, generally referred to as the Treasury
Department's "Circular230," and would be binding on certified public
accountants, "enrolled agents" who are authorized to represent taxpayers before the Service on the basis of either a qualifying examination or previous employment with the IRS, and lawyers. s '

provision is very limited. Schlenger & Watkins, Exploringthe Myths of Circular230, 62 TAXES
283" (1984). While there is no definitive guidance on this point (in large measure, apparently,
because the Treasury to date has exercised its regulatory powers sparingly), the limited authority
that does exist suggests that the Treasury's regulatory authority is at least sufficiently broad
as to encompass regulation of the kind recently proposed by the Treasury. Cf. Joslin v. Secretary
of Dep't of Treasury, 616 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Utah 1985) (upholding the constitutional validity
of Treasury regulations, described infra note 81, governing content of lawyers' opinions in 'tax
shelter" offerings); Poole v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-5195 (June 29, 1984) (in
upholding Treasury's disbarment of practitioner for failure to file income tax returns, court
indicates that Congress intended to give Treasury broad regulatory authority). It seems likely
that Congress intended to grant the Treasury disciplinary authority similar to that exercised
by courts in regulating members of the bar - an authority that historically has been of wide
scope. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 20-31.
81. Federal statute provides that lawyers and certified public accountants, by virtue of
their licenses to practice granted by the various states, are admitted automatically to practice
before the Treasury. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1982). The Treasury accords practice privileges to "enrolled
agents," and to certain actuaries practicing in the field of employee benefit taxation by regulation.
31 C.F.R. §§ 10.3-.4 (1987). See generally Cogdell, Practice Before the IRS and Circular230,
Tax. Mgmt. (BNA) 147 (1987).
Until the early 1980s, the Treasury's disciplinary regulations provided no detailed guidance
concerning what might constitute "disreputable" behavior, and the Treasury exercised its disciplinary authority only in cases of aggravated misconduct involving, for example, bribery or fraud.
See generally Annotation, DisciplinaryAction Under 31 USCS § 1026 Authorizing Secretary
of the Treasury to Suspend and Disbar Any Person Representing Claimants From Further
PracticeBefore the Treasury Department, 50 A.L.R. FED. 817 (1980 & Supp. 1987). In the
early 1980s, the Treasury amended Circular 230 to require practitioners to include extended
discussions of tax risks in opinions for use by potential investors in 'tax shelter" offerings. 31
C.F.R. § 10.33 (1987). See generally Barker, Legal and EthicalResponsibilities in Tax-Favored
Transactions, 35 U. S. CAL. TAX INST. 19-1, 19-6 to 19-32 (1983); Falik, Standardsfor Professionals Providing Tax Opinions in Tax Shelter Offerings - An Analysis of the Treasury's
Final Circular230 Regulations and a Comparisonto ABA FormalOpinion 346, 37 TAx LAW.
701 (1984); Holden, supra note 48, at 222-34; Note, Redefining the Attorney's Role in Abusive
Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REv. 889 (1985). The tax shelter rules represented the first instance
in which the Treasury sought to regulate the content of attorney communications in a context
not necessarily involving fraud or gross incompetence.
The Treasury's tax shelter rules resulted from extended discussions between the Treasury
and practitioner groups. As one result of these discussions, the ABA Ethics Committee issued
its own opinion governing tax shelter opinions, which sets forth disclosure rules largely identical
to those of Circular 230. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
346 (1982), reprinted in B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE 186-82 (2d ed. 1985). In issuing its ethical opinion consistent with the Treasury's
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Unlike Formal Opinion 85-352, the Treasury proposal states that
"[a] tax return is not a submission in an adversary [proceeding]." 12
Instead, the Treasury proposal states that "the tax return serves a
disclosure, reporting and self-assessment function."1 Rather than basing its disciplinary standards on the rules of legal ethics, the Treasury
proposal states that the practitioner has a "responsibility to adhere
to the compliance provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." Thus,
the proposal confronts directly the question of what constitutes the
"law" governing the submission of a tax return. The Treasury proposal
is based on the view that the penalty under section 6661 establishes

a legal obligation of the taxpayer. If a client seeks to state a position
which the practitioner believes would invoke the section 6661 penalty

if detected, the practitioner must first advise the client of the potential
application of the penalty., If the taxpayer refuses to make the disclosure necessary to avoid the penalty, the practitioner cannot assist the
client in stating the position on the return.s

new approach, however, the ABA indicated that it acted from considerations of investor protection, rather than from a desire to protect the revenue. The Treasury, in contrast, emphasized
the practitioner's duty to the tax system. Indeed, Treasury General Counsel Mundheim said
that there was "irony in viewing [tax shelter opinions] as raising significant investor protection
issues," because investors knowingly used questionable opinions by counsel in order to gain
insulation from taxpayer penalties in the event of an IRS audit. Mundheim, Remarks on Standards for Tax Attorneys, Daily Tax Report (BNA), J-1 to J-2 (Jan. 22, 1980), reprinted in B.
WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 175, 176 (2d
ed. 1985).
The current controversy over standards for return preparation thus represents the first
instance in which the private bar and the Treasury have squarely joined issue over rules
unambiguously designed to enforce a practitioner's duties to the revenue system.
82. Proposed Amendments to 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, supra note 4, at 29, 113.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 29,115 (proposed amendment to 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)).
86. The Treasury proposal would require the practitioner to advise the client of the potential
applicability of the section 6661 penalty if 'the practitioner determines that the taxpayer filing
the return may be liable for an addition to tax under the section." Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, the practitioner would be prohibited from assisting in a return position "unless in the
exercise of due diligence the practitioner determines that the taxpayer filing the return will
not be liable for an addition to tax under section 6661." Id. (proposed amendments to 31 C.F.R.
§§ 10.34(b), (c) (emphasis added)). On its face, this would seem to expose the practitioner to
disciplinary action where the practitioner assists in a position that creates even a slight possibility
of the imposition of a penalty under § 6661. Cf. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Comments
on Proposed Modification of Circular230, 34 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1113, 1115 (Mar.
16, 1987). A better approach, assuming that the Treasury retains the concept of basing its
disciplinary standard on a taxpayer penalty provision, would be to subject the practitioner to
discipline only where the practitioner assists a client in a position which the practitioner believes
more probably than not will be subject to the penalty if the position is detected.
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Regardless of their ultimate fate, the Treasury's proposals have
performed a significant service by shifting the focus of analysis from
an inevitably fruitless attempt to derive a practitioner standard from
the rules of legal ethics, to a direct examination of the law governing
taxpayer behavior. The following discussion pursues this analysis, first
by inquiring into the definition of "law" for purposes of the requirement
that lawyers assist clients only within the bounds of the law, and next
by considering where the civil penalties governing taxpayers' positions
on returns stand in relation to this definition. Consideration of these
questions reveals a surprising and largely intractable degree of normative ambiguity in the relations among taxpayers, practitioners, and
the government.
III.

CIVIL PENALTIES AND THE "BOUNDS OF LAW"

Despite the centrality of the question, the ABA's ethical codes
provide little guidance concerning the meaning of the requirement
that lawyers operate only within the bounds of law. The 1908 Canons
of Professional Ethics provided no elaboration of the requirements of
Canons 15 and 22, referred to in Formal Opinion 314,17 that legal
representation remain "within . . . the bounds of law" and that the
lawyer refrain from assisting the client in any "fraud or chicane."
Similarly, the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility provided the
admonitions that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law," and that the lawyer may not "[c]ounsel or
assist [the] client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." 9 The Code provided no guidance as to the meaning of
"illegal," nor any indication of the kind of conduct that might be
"fraudulent" while at the same time not be "illegal."
It has been suggested that the absence of specificity concerning
the source of the practitioner's 'legal" obligations has derived in part
from a tendency within the organized bar to avoid acknowledging the
dependence of the ethical codes on general rules of law, in order to
safeguard the independence of the bar in regulating its members. 9°

87.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

88.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

89.

Id.; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1969).

Canon 7 (1969).

90. Patterson writes that to acknowledge the dependence of the lawyer's obligations on the
legal obligations of the client requires that the lawyer's duties be recognized as dependent rather than independent. The result is to circumscribe the lawyer's freedom of action, for if the lawyer's
duties in acting for the client are derivative in nature, the source of those rights
and duties is ultimately the positive or general law, which imposes substantial
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Alternatively, the lack of discussion of the definition of "law" in the
ethical codes may reflect reluctance on the part of the drafters to
confront the very difficult issues that arise once it is acknowledged
that the term "law" is not self-defining.91 Whatever the reasons, the
failure of the 1908 and 1969 formulations to consider explicitly the
role of the client's legal obligations in defining the professional responsibilities of lawyers almost certainly has contributed to the legal profession's inability to deal effectively with the question of the lawyer's
duties where the client's legal obligations are uncertain.
The drafters of the 1983 Model Rules were a bit more specific in
prohibiting lawyer assistance in illegal conduct.Y Model Rule 1.2(d)
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist
a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."93

constraints on the client's - and thus the lawyer's - conduct. If the lawyer's
duties are independent, however, their source is not the positive law but the rules
of ethics, which provide substantially more freedom of action, as Opinion 314 demonstrates.
Patterson, supra note 8, at 1175.
91. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
92. The drafters probably responded at least in part to an analysis by Geoffrey Hazard,
who served as Reporter for the ABA commission that proposed the 1983 Rules. See Hazard,
How FarMay a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongafl Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 669 (1981). Professor Hazard, employing arguments similar to those of Professor
Patterson, supra note 90, criticized the failure of previous ethical formulations to address the
connection between "general law" and the "riles of legal ethics":
Although it may seem obvious that interpretation of a lawyer's legal duty frequently
requires reference to general law as distinct from the rules of legal ethics, many
lawyers seem to assume that the text of the Model Code is an exhaustive statement
of the law governing their professional conduct. The Code is not exhaustive, however, for it does not purport to be preemptive. On the contrary, the rules of
professional ethics presuppose and supplement the law at large, including criminal
law, constitutional law, criminal procedure and civil procedure.
Hazard, supra, at 676.
While Professor Hazard did not attempt to draft a rule of legal ethics in the course of his
article, it is clear that he recommended a rule that would seek to identify, and prohibit lawyer
assistance in, conduct in which the client is normatively prohibited (by reference to proscriptions
in the "general" law) from engaging. Professor Hazard recognized that this would entail distinguishing among legal provisions that do, and do not, establish normative proscriptions. "[T]he
question concerns action by the client that is in some degree illegal. 'Illegality' is itself a matter
of degree." Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
93. The drafters apparently borrowed the prohibition of assistance in "criminal or fraudulent" activity from the law of evidence, which provides generally that the privilege for attorneyclient communications is not available where the client seeks legal assistance in the hope of
perpetrating a crime or fraud. See generally Fried, Too High a Pricefor Truth: The Exception
to the Attorney-Client Privilegefor Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L. REV. 443
(1986). Arguably, the evidentiary privilege should extend even to situations where the client
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The prohibition of lawyer assistance in "criminal or fraudulent"
behavior has considerable appeal in identifying conduct in which the
client has no proper claim to legal assistance. While different criminal
acts may involve varying degrees of culpability, by designating conduct
as "criminal" the legislative authority clearly signifies that the conduct
is normatively wrong.9 The prohibition of assistance in criminal conduct also operates to preclude assistance in many intentional torts,
because in many instances the behavior that constitutes an intentional
tort may also give rise to criminal liability.95
The prohibition against assistance in "fraudulent" conduct reflects
universal social condemnation of deceit in interpersonal and commercial
relations, as well as in legal proceedings, which depend on truthful
presentations by opposing parties to resolve disputes fairly. From a
strictly logical standpoint, the prohibition of assistance in "fraudulent"
activities may be unnecessary, because conduct that is fraudulent
should, as a general rule, also involve potential criminal liability. The
use of the word "fraudulent" in Model Rule 1.2(d), however, serves
the important purpose of indicating that the attorney is permitted to
assist in nondeceitful conduct in which the client openly breaches a
contractual obligation.9 In most instances, the modern contract simply
represents an undertaking by the parties that if they do not perform,
they will pay appropriate damages. The party who decides to breach,
and thereby incur liability for damages, may act within the realm of
normal commercial expectation and does not necessarily breach a normative obligation.Y The prohibition of assistance in "fraudulent" activity
thus serves fairly well to distinguish situations in which the attorney
does, and does not, act consistently with the lawyer's proper social role.

seeks impermissible assistance. A major purpose of the evidentiary privilege is to encourage
clients to seek legal advice in the hope that the lawyer will discourage proposed illegal activity.
This purpose probably cannot be served effectively if the client risks exposure simply by consulting the lawyer. Cf. id. at 492-98.
94. See, e.g., Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Frameworkfor
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MiNN. L. REV. 379, 406-10 (1976); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEmp. PRons. 401, 404 (1958).
95. Hazard, supra note 92, at 674.
Certain kinds of torts are readily subsumed under the the rubric of "illegality."
These torts include the civil counterparts of criminal offenses that are mala in se:
wrongful death by willful unexcused act, physically harmful battery, knowing conversion, and some forms of abuse of process. Other intentional torts, such as piracy
of trade secrets or invasion of privacy, can also be included.
Id.
96. Id.
97. Cf. generally Pepper, supra note 19, at 625.
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Despite its attractions, however, the "crime or fraud" standard
does not on its face reveal whether the lawyer properly can assist the
client in violating the civil penalties under sections 6653(a) and 6661,
which govern questionable legal positions in tax returns. These penalties certainly are directed against behavior that is in some measure
deceptive.9 Nevertheless, this behavior does not necessarily constitute
"fraud," which has a special meaning under the Internal Revenue Code
and is addressed by severe criminal and civil penalties distinct from
those of sections 6653(a) and 6661. An attempt to measure the standards under sections 6653(a) and 6661 against the "crime or fraud"
prohibition of Model Rule 1.2(d) requires a somewhat closer review
of the hierarchy of penalties in the Code, as well as a consideration
of the social goals the Congress has addressed in determining the level
of sanctions that Congress has applied against different forms of taxpayer behavior.
IV.

CHARACTERIZING THE CODE'S CIVIL TAXPAYER PENALTIES

A. Description of the Penalties
While the Internal Revenue Code provides numerous penalties for
specifically proscribed acts, such as for failure to pay to the government taxes withheld from employees,9 or for overvaluations of property donated to charity,1 ° the general penalties for underpayment fall
into three categories. These include: (1) civil and criminal penalties
for willful evasion and fraud, (2) the "negligence or disregard" penalty
of section 6653(a), and (3) the "substantial understatement" penalty
of section 6661.

98. Arguably, in the case where nondeceptive conduct is subject only to a civil as opposed
to a criminal penalty, Model Rule 1.2(d) unambiguously permits lawyer assistance in conduct
that will invoke the penalty:.
[I]t is only in its criminal law that a society issues "absolute" commands. Indeed,
many take the view that civil sanctions of various kinds are no more than a
calculable "cost of doing business," and that people have a "right" to violate these
norms in exchange for paying whatever price the civil law commands, be it a tort
judgment or an administrative fine or restitution order. By drawing the line at
lawyer participation in criminal conduct (as well as fraud), the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct implicitly adopt this view.
G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 74, at 43. The current discussion, however, addresses
civil tax penalties which involve conduct that is at least to some extent deceptive, therefore
rendering indeterminate the proper application of Rule 1.2(d)'s proscription of attorney assistance
in "fraud."
99. I.R.C. § 6672.
100. See I.R.C. § 6659 (setting forth penalty for overvaluations of property leading to
overstatements of tax deductions).
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Section 7201 imposes criminal penalties, including a fine of up to
$250,000 and imprisonment for up to five years, on "[a]ny person who
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax. '1°1 Section
7203 imposes a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to one
year for willful failure to file tax returns or pay taxes, and section

7207 imposes a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to one
year for filing a "fraudulent" return. Courts generally uphold these

criminal penalties only where a taxpayer knowingly fails to pay a tax
where there was no question at all that a tax was due. Those convicted
of criminal tax violations have usually taken some affirmative steps
to conceal their obligations, such as falsifying documents.I °2 A lawyer

101. While Code § 7201 generally specifies a fine of up to $100,000, the federal criminal
statutes preempt this figure and impose a maximum fine of $250,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)
(1984) (classifying violation of I.R.C. § 7201 as a "Class D felony," by reference to the five-year
maximum term of imprisonment provided under the Code); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (authorizing fine of not more than $250,000 for an individual committing any felony). The maximum
fine is doubled where the convicted party is an organization. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1984). See
generally Garbis & Fisher, The Tilted Table:Penaltiesand Interest on Federal Tax Deficiencies,
7 VA. TAx REv. 485, 503-04 (1988) (describing recent increases in penalties for criminal tax
offenses).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1984), violation of Code §§ 7203 or 7207 is classified as a "Class A
misdemeanor," by virtue of the maximum terms of imprisonment authorized under the Code,
and under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5) (1984) the maximum fine for an individual convicted of a Class
A misdemeanor that does not result in death is $100,000. The fine is doubled, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(c)(5) (1984), where the convicted party is an organization.
The Code provides numerous criminal penalties in addition to the felony sanctions of § 7201
and the misdemeanor sanctions of §§ 7203 & 7207. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7206 (authorizing fine and
imprisonment for making fraudulent statements in connection with tax matters). For a general
review of criminal penalties in tax matters, see M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 7.01 - 7.07, at 7-3 to 7-49 (1981).
102. In Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943), the Supreme Court held that a conviction
for the felony of tax evasion, under a predecessor of I.R.C. § 7201, required an "affirmative
act" of evasion or concealment. As examples of "affirmative acts," the court pointed to conduct such as keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations,
or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of
assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making
the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of
which would be to mislead or to conceal.
Id. at 499. While the case law does not firmly establish an "affirmative act" requirement for
misdemeanor criminal fraud under § 7207, a prosecution under the provision "usually involves
the same type of evidence [as that] outlined in Spies." M. SALTZMAN, supra note 101,
7.04,
at 7-25. Cf. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973) (requirement that criminal violation
must have been committed "willfully" has same meaning 'inboth tax felonies and tax misdemeanors"). The precise bounds of the criminal penalties are not clear, because the government
seems to have asserted them only in instances of egregious misbehavior. Almost certainly,
however, a court would not uphold a criminal penalty of any kind where a taxpayer had any
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who knowingly assists a client in commiting a criminal tax violation
not only violates Model Rule 1.2(d), but also is personally guilty of
criminal violations under several federal statutes. 103
In addition to the criminal penalties, section 6653(b) imposes a
penalty equal to seventy-five percent of 'the portion of [an] underpay-

ment which is attributable to fraud."10 This provision functions as a
civil counterpart to the criminal evasion and fraudulent return statutes,
and permits the government to apply sanctions against culpable behavior without meeting the "reasonable doubt" standard applicable to

criminal prosecutions. o5 Imposition of the civil fraud penalty normally
requires a showing of the same kind of "active" misconduct required

for imposition of the criminal penalties, and the civil fraud penalty
generally will not be imposed where there is any legal question whatsoever as to the underlying tax liability. °6 Attorney assistance in this
conduct, which the Code itself labels "fraud," obviously would violate

colorable argument that a position taken in a return was correct. See also infra note 106
(suggesting that "affirmative acts" or similar evidence may be needed even to support civil
fraud penalty under I.R.C. § 6653(b)).
103. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (person making false statement to government
agency is guilty of felony); I.R.C. § 7206(2) (person aiding or assisting in filing a false return
is guilty of felony).
104. The 75% penalty is augmented by an additional amount equal to half the statutory
interest due on the portion of the underpayment attributable to fraud. I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1)(B).
For a discussion of changes to the fraud penalty in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see inf'ranote 171.
Under proposed technical corrections, the penalty's additional charge of one-half the statutory
interest on the underlying tax deficiency would be replaced by a requirement that interest be
paid on the penalty itself, computed from the date on which the underlying tax return was due.
Technical Corrections Bill of 1988, supra note 41, § 115 (b).
105. The civil fraud provision is designed to give "executive officers the power to enforce
[taxpayer obligations] without the necessity of invoking the judicial power." Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S 391, 399 (1938) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,
329 (1909)).
106. Most federal appeals courts that have considered the matter require a showing of the
kind of "affirmative act" suggested in Spies, 317 U.S. 492. See Zell v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d
1139 (10th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1958); First Trust & Sav.
Bank v. United States, 206 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1953). In Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d
1002 (3d Cir. 1968), the court found that the taxpayer's consistent failure to file returns, over
a period of 16 years, supported imposition of the fraud penalty despite the absence of any
"affirmative act" other than the failure to file the returns. In Stoltzfus, the court noted that
the taxpayer had 'no contemporaneous reasonable basis for believing that taxes were not owed."
Id. at 1005 (footnote omitted). See generally McCawley, Civil Tax Penalties,Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
2d Ser., § 441, at A-15 (1986). Despite its willingness to impose a civil fraud penalty even in
the absence of an "affirmative act," it is extremely unlikely that the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit would support imposition of a fraud penalty where a taxpayer had any basis at
all for a claim that a tax was not legally owing.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

31

Florida Law
Review, LAW
Vol. 39,
Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY
OFFLORIDA
REVIEW

(Vol. 39

Model Rule 1.2(d). This action also would subject the lawyer to substantial civil penalties under section 6701, which imposes penalties on
any person who knowingly assists in the preparation of returns containing understatements of tax liability.0 7
Unlike the criminal and civil fraud penalties, the penalty under
section 6653(a) does not require a showing of affirmative concealment
by the taxpayer. 1°8 The statute currently imposes a penalty of five
percent, plus a fifty percent addition to the interest normally charged
on an understatement, for any understatement caused in whole or in
part by "negligence or disregard of rules or regulations."' 109 This penalty has been imposed both for negligence in recordkeeping" ° and for
understatements based on highly questionable return positions.," At
least to date, the case law establishes generally that to the extent
section 6653(a) applies to questionable positions on returns, the penalty
is subject to a "reasonable basis" standard.1 1
Although section 6653(a) does not impose a criminal penalty, and
the Code does not label behavior invoking the penalty as "fraudulent,"
willful attorney assistance in positions that incur the section 6653(a)
penalty almost certainly violates the prohibition against assisting in a

107. Section 6701 generally imposes a penalty of up to $1,000 on a person providing advice
which the person "knows" will result in an understatement on a return. This provision was
enacted because "Congress felt that it is inappropriate to impose sizable civil fraud penalties
on taxpayers but to allow the advisors who aid or assist in the underpayment of tax to escape
civil sanctions." STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2d SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAx EQUITY AND FIscAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, 220 (Joint Comm. Print 1982).
108. See, e.g., Kotmair v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1253 (1986) (court imposes "disregard"
penalty of I.R.C. § 6653(a), but not fraud penalty of I.R.C. § 6653(b), on 'tax protester" who
refused to include on return information needed to compute tax liability).
109. Under proposed technical corrections, the penalty's additional charge of one-half the
statutory interest on the tax deficiency would be replaced by a requirement that interest be
paid on the penalty itself, computed from the date on which the underlying tax return was due.
Technical Corrections Bill of 1988, supm note 41, § 115(b).
110. See, e.g., Zivnuska v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 226, 239-41 (1959) (penalty upheld where
taxpayer failed to keep books and records adequate to support claimed deductions). In the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Congress added § 6653(g) to the Code, which provides that where a
taxpayer fails to include on a return income reported to the IRS in a report filed by a payer
(e.g., interest payments reported to the IRS by a bank on Form 1099), the omission will be
deemed caused by negligence "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary."
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1503(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2742 (1986).
111. See, e.g., Grant v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 809, 826-27 (1985) (penalty upheld where,
in direct violation of Treasury regulation, taxpayer deducted value of personal services provided
to charitable organization), affd, 800 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1986).
112. See supra note 31.
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client's "crime or fraud." Stating a position which the lawyer knows
has no reasonable support is tantamount to stating a position that the
lawyer knows, beyond reasonable doubt, is incorrect. Behavior of this
kind, which relies for success wholly on nondetection, amounts to
deception and thus merges into the commonly understood definition
of 'Traud." 13 Prohibiting deliberate practitioner assistance in return
positions not meeting the standard of section 6653(a) thus creates no
serious possibility of depriving taxpayers of legal assistance in actions
the taxpayers are legally entitled to take.
It is much more difficult to determine whether assistance in positions violating the "substantial authority" standard of section 6661 is
inconsistent with a lawyer's obligation to refrain from assisting in a
"crime or fraud." When a lawyer knowingly assists a client in stating
a position that will be subject to the penalty under section 6661 for
lack of "substantial authority," it is likely that the lawyer believes
that the position probably is not correct. Moreover, because the penalty will be invoked only where the client has declined to disclose the
position specifically on the return, it is fair to say that the client is
relying at least in part on concealment in the hope of nondetection.
Nevertheless, it is clear under the Code that a position can lack "substantial authority" and yet still have a "reasonable basis.' ' 14 A position
without "substantial authority" thus need not be "false," and hence is
not necessarily "fraudulent," in any absolute sense. The fact that the
"substantial authority" penalty under section 6661 is, in effect, twice
removed (by virtue of the intervening placement of the "negligence
or disregard" penalty of section 6653(a)) from the "fraud" penalty of
section 6653(b) counsels caution in concluding that intentional violation
of section 6661 constitutes a "fraud" under Model Rule 1.2(d). Does
intentional violation of the section 6661 standard constitute a "fraud,"
or merely a "fraudlet"?" 5
B. "Civil" Penalties - A Normative Spectrum
"Civil" penalties have a long history, both within and outside the
context of taxation.116 They arose from the public authority's practical
113. Indeed, in Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1020 (1969), the court upheld a fraud penalty based on a finding 'that the taxpayer
had no contemporaneous reasonable basis for believing that taxes were not owed."
114. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115. See Falk, supra note 72, at 649 ("In between criminal fraud and a substantial understatement, many 'fraudlets' lie.").
116. For a relatively early discussion, see Note, Statutory Penalties - A Legal Hybrid,
51 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1938). Civil penalties are now extremely common, pervading trade
regulation, environmental law, and many other fields, as well as taxation. See, e.g., Diver, The
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need to enforce social imperatives without invoking the procedural
machinery of the criminal law in every instance. 117 Reflecting this
history, both the case law and the literature on civil penalties have
focused primarily on the extent of the procedural protections that
should be accorded to defendants accused of "civil" rather than "crim-

inal" violations.lls
Despite the importance of the question to the lawyer's professional

obligations, however, relatively little attention has focused on the
extent to which civil penalties define normative "legal" obligations.

This discussion provides a framework for considering whether a particular penalty defines a normative obligation, and then applies this
framework to section 6661.

Civil penalties can be described by reference to a spectrum defined
by two competing models. At one end of the spectrum, civil penalties
are directed at conduct that also is proscribed under the criminal law.
A civil penalty corresponding to this model serves only to give the

public authority procedural flexibility in enforcing its mandate. There
is no question that the conduct addressed by a penalty conforming to
this model is normatively prohibited, since the behavior could give

rise to criminal as well as civil sanctions. A civil penalty conforming
to this model can, for convenience, be labeled "quasi-criminal." 9 An
example of a quasi-criminal penalty is the civil fraud penalty of section
6653(b). The "reasonable basis" penalty of section 6653(a) also conforms
quite closely to the quasi-criminal model, which explains the wide-

Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79
COLUM L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1979) (author identifies 348 civil penalties under federal law);
Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties As a
Sanction by FederalAdministrative Agencies, in RECOMMENDATIONS Av4D REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896 (1972).
117. See Clark, supra note 94, at 381-82; cf. supra note 105.
118. See generally Charney, The Need for ConstitutionalProtections for Defendants in
Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478 (1974); Clark, supra note 94, passim. For a
recent case upholding a party's right to a jury trial on the question whether the party was
liable for certain civil penalties for violation of the federal clean water laws (but permitting the
court to determine the amount of applicable penalties without participation by the jury), see
Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
119. The term "quasi-criminal" originates in the judicial opinions considering the extent of
the procedural protections to be afforded defendants in civil proceedings. See Clark, supra note
94, at 414-20. Professor Clark criticizes judicial use of the term on grounds that by determining,
in conclusory fashion, that a given penalty was or was not "quasi-criminal," courts have avoided
developing explicit rationales for their decisions. Id. Professor Clark's objections should not
apply to the use of the term here simply to define one of two competing paradigms of civil
penalties.
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spread acceptance of the adoption of "reasonable basis" as an ethical
standard in Formal Opinion 314. m
At the other extreme, a civil penalty can represent merely a publicly imposed fee designed to limit a morally acceptable, or even socially
desirable, activity to a socially optimal level. The "effluent charge"
often recommended by economists to control discharges of environmental pollutants is an example of this kind of penalty.Y' Under an effluent
charge regime, all emitters of pollution are charged a fee per unit
(e.g., ton) of pollutants released. The fee is designed to approximate
the social harm caused by the release of the pollution. The primary
advantage of the effluent charge is its tendency to concentrate pollution
abatement efforts among those emitters who can reduce discharges
at the least expense, while permitting others to continue polluting
provided they can demonstrate, by paying the fees, that emissions
are generating value at least equal to the harm they cause.ma Under
an effluent fee system, there is nothing morally reprehensible about
emitting a unit of pollution so long as the applicable charge is paid.
Indeed, the governmental authority setting the charge anticipates that
a certain amount of pollution will occur and tries to set the fee at a
level that limits emissions to an acceptable level. From the lawyer's
standpoint, there would be nothing improper about counseling a client
to engage in an activity involving the discharge of pollution, provided
the client was prepared to pay the required fee. m A penalty fitting

120.

See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.

121.

See generally A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POL-

icY (1975).
122.

R. HEILBRONER & L. THUROW, EcoNOMIcs EXPLAINED 175-76 (1982).

When a government decides to tax pollution... it is essentially creating a price
system for disposal processes. If an individual company found that it could clean
up its own pollutants more cheaply than paying the tax, it would do so, thereby
avoiding the tax. If the company could not clean up its own pollutants more cheaply
than the tax cost, which is often the case, it would pay the necessary tax and look
to the state to clean up the environment.
Id. Obviously, effluent charges cannot be used where effluents cannot be measured accurately,
or where even small amounts of pollutants can cause very severe damage. See, e.g., id at 176;
Weitzman, Prices v. Quantities, 61 REv. ECON. STUD. 472 (1974). Despite the limitations on
their use, however, there is broad consensus among economists that in many circumstances,
effluent fees can yield a given level of abatement at much lower cost than can fixed effluent
limitations applying equally to all emitters, regardless of their abatement costs.
123. Despite their attractions, effluent charges have not been received favorably in the
United States, in large measure because policy-makers have been uncomfortable with the notion
of morally neutral fees (as opposed to "penalties') being used to control a social "bad" like
pollution. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 121, at 116-17, ascribe this to the 'qegaP
orientation of many legislators:
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the model of the effluent fee may, for purposes of convenience, be
labeled a "benefit charge."
Few statutory penalties will conform fully to the benefit-charge
model. As a general rule, labeling a charge as a "penalty" may reflect
a legislative determination that the person incurring it has, at least
to some extent, failed to fulfill a civic responsibility. There is probably
some element of moral opprobrium associated with imposition of virtually all legal penalties. 12 Nevertheless, in many cases the legislature's decision to use a civil rather than a criminal penalty suggests
that the degree of moral opprobrium may be limited.'2 In accordance

[Tihe legal approach to certain types of social problems can sometimes be highly
inappropriate. In some ways the legal and the economic approaches to questions
stand in sharp contrast to each other. Legal training necessarily, and quite properly,
concentrates on the specification of rights and duties in law or in regulations ....
The fact
The economic aproach stresses not rights and duties but incentives ....
that the incentive approach is often given such short shrift in favor of the regulatory
approach is hardly unexpected in view of the predominance of lawyers in Congress.
Id.; see also infra note 125.
124. The author is grateful to Robert E. Rodes and John H. Robinson for discussion of
this point, and the related point addressed infra note 125.
125. Traditional jurisprudence seems to have had difficulty accepting the notion that legal
sanctions may establish different gradations of moral obligation. Blackstone, for example, recognized a distinction between obligations that bind "in conscience" and those that do not, but then
refused to recognize a continuous spectrum between the two:
[I]n relation to those laws, which enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such
things as are not mala in se, but ma/a prohibitamerely, without any intermixture
of moral guilt, annexing a penalty to noncompliance, here I apprehend conscience
is no farther concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty, in case of
our breach of those laws: for otherwise the multitude of penal laws in a state would
not only be looked upon as impolitic, but would also be a very wicked thing;, if
every such law were a snare for the conscience of the subject. But in these cases
the alternative is offered to every man; "either abstain from this, or submit to
such a penalty": and his conscience will be clear, whichever side of the alternative
It must however be observed, that we are here
he thinks proper to embrace ....
speaking of laws that are simply and purely penal, where the thing forbidden or
enjoined is wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty inflicted is an
adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise from the offense. But where disobedience to the law involves in it also any degree of public
mischief or private injury, there it falls within our former distinction, and is also
an offence against conscience.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *57-58 (footnote omitted). See generally T. DAvrIr, THE
ELEMENTS OF LAW 188-95 (1959) (discusses treatment of concept of "purely penal law" in
Blackstone's and other traditional jurisprudence).
Contemporary jurisprudence, largely through the influence of Holmes, generally has accepted
the notion of a range of levels of normative obligation under the law (see generally Golding,
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America - Major Themes and
Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 442-44 (1986)), but seems, in the context of legal ethics,
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with the benefit-charge model, the legislature may well intend to leave
the individual some discretion whether to violate the standard of the
penalty, if the benefits derived from doing so exceed the costs of the
penalty.
The particular political and economic context of taxpaying supplies
numerous reasons why the Congress might design a penalty that conforms in part to both the quasi-criminal and benefit-charge models.
Favoring a quasi-criminal approach are the potentially high social costs
of insupportable positions on returns. Most immediately, insupportable
return positions enable taxpayers to avoid their proper liabilities, thus
distorting the allocation of tax burdens that Congress sought to establish. If the politically determined allocation of the tax burden is to be
respected, the distortion of this allocation must be viewed as imposing
real costs on society. Widespread avoidance, moreover, can weaken
public confidence in the tax system, eroding compliance further and
ultimately limiting the usefulness of the income tax as a revenue-raising tool.
Even in view of the costs of noncompliance, however, several considerations suggest that the government should exercise restraint in
using criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions to control questionable tax
return positions. Most basically, the value of individual autonomy implies that where the law is unclear, as the tax laws often are, individuals should be given a fair degree of latitude in resolving doubts in
their favor. "[The very meaning of a line in the law is that you
intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it,'126
and given the complexity of many portions of the tax law it is inevitable

to have explored the implications of this to a surprisingly limited extent. Cf., e.g., Pepper, A
Rejoinder to ProfessorsKaufman and Luban, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657, 670 n.52 ("If
one posits a continuum with breach of contract on one end and murder on the other, where the

line is drawn on the advice a lawyer can give about enforcement possibilities and the consequences
of violation... may well be [a question] leading to large and difficult jurisprudential problems.").
126.

Superior Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930)

(Holmes, J.). In SuperiorOil Co., the Court addressed the question whether certain purchases
in Mississippi of gasoline ultimately to be resold to shrimp fishermen in Louisiana were purchases
in "interstate commerce" so as to insulate the purchasers from Mississippi state taxation. The

Court determined that the connection with Louisiana was too remote to protect the transactions
from Mississippi taxation. In reaching this result, however, Justice Holmes said that "[t]he fact
the [the purchasers in Mississippi] desired to evade the law, as it is called," by signing documents
indicating the gasoline was destined for use in Louisiana, was "immaterial, because the very

meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do
not pass it." Id. Randolph Paul has applied this language to a discussion of professional responsibilities in tax practice, in The Lawyer as Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 412, 415
(1953), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 64, 67 (B.
Bittker ed. 1970).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

37

Florida Law
Review, Vol.
Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 2
REVIEW
LAW39,
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

[Vol. 39

that in probing the boundaries of the law taxpayers will on occasion
breach it. Some level of questionable tax reporting is a necessary
incident to a self-assessed tax system, just as some level of environmental pollution is necessary to a functioning economy.
This is not to say that society should not try to control aggressiveness in formulating return positions, any more than society should
ignore the costs of environmental pollution. Nevertheless, the recognition that some level of aggressiveness is inevitable implies limitations
on the measures that should be used to control it. Control measures
cannot consist entirely of "quasi-criminal" penalties that create an
absolute normative obligation not to engage in the sanctioned behavior.
Once it is accepted that some level of noncompliance through questionable return positions is acceptable (or at least inevitable), the use
of a penalty conforming to the benefit-charge model can serve the
important role of confining attempts to "game" the system through
questionable reporting positions to those who most value the opportunity to do so. Only those with relatively strong preferences for questionable positions will elect to take them. A properly designed penalty,
based in part on the benefit-charge model, should serve to reduce
aggregate taxpayer dissatisfaction with the tax system, while at the
same time limiting the incidence of aggressive return positions to a
socially acceptable level.'7
Of course, even if the legislature uses a penalty based in part on
the benefit-charge model, it should also retain quasi-criminal penalties
to control the more extreme kinds of misbehavior. The legislature
would not want, for example, to promote the view that any level of
blatant tax fraud was acceptable, since this would create huge enforcement costs and would very rapidly erode public confidence in the tax
system. For similar reasons, the legislature might want to retain quasicriminal penalties for positions which, while not based on active deception, are without any real legal basis and would almost certainly be
overturned if detected and challenged. Nevertheless, those penalties
applying to behavior that is less patently dbceptive probably should
incorporate aspects of the benefit-charge, as well as quasi-criminal,
models.

127.

"T]here seems to be a certain psychic satisfaction in being able to do something about

one's tax liability - to take advantage of some election or choice, or to reduce the tax by some
advance planning." Does the Tax PractitionerOwe a DualResponsibility?, supranote 9, at 29.
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V.

SECTION

6661

AND THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN

"QUASI-CRIMINAL" AND "BENEFIT-CHARGE" PENALTIES

A.

Legislative History

The legislative record suggests that in enacting section 6661, participants in the legislative process had in mind elements of both the
benefit-charge and quasi-criminal models Of civil penalties. m The legislative antecedents of section 6661 include a proposal, in identical House
and Senate bills, for a ten percent penalty on "substantial understatements" that were not disclosed on the taxpayer's return, 1 and a
competing proposal in a 1982 House bill for an interest surcharge at

a level that probably would have resulted in a penalty of fifteen to
twenty percent on any "substantial understatement" of liability,
whether or not disclosed. 1 Under the first proposal, the Treasury

would not have been able to waive the ten percent penalty under any
circumstances. The absence of any ground for waiver strongly suggests
that the authors viewed the penalty as applying on a benefit-charge
basis.1 31 Under the competing proposal, the Treasury would have been
authorized to waive the proposed interest surcharge if 'there was a
reasonable basis for the understatement (or part thereof) and the
taxpayer acted in good faith."' 2 The incorporation of the relatively

128. The legislative history of the "substantial authority" penalty is described generally in
Barker, supra note 81, at 19-37 to 19-38; Raby, TEFRA: Impact on Taxpayer Compliance, J.
AcCT., Nov. 1982, at 64, 64-67.
129. H.R. 5829, § 125, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2198, § 125, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
130. H.R. 6300, § 503, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The interest surcharge would have
been equal to 20% of the interest charged normally on tax underpayments. Given the interest
rate on tax underpayments of 20% that prevailed in 1982, the surcharge would have been 4%
per year. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPARATIVE
DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 6300 (THE TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1982) AND H.R. 5829 (THE
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1982) 36 (Joint Comm. Print 1982). In view

of the length of time between the filing of a return and the completion of an audit (typically at
least three to four years), the interest surcharge could easily have amounted to a charge of
15-20%.
Under both H.R. 6300 and H.R. 5829, the definition of "substantial" understatement would
have been similar to that under I.R.C. § 6661 as enacted. Cf. supranote 42 and accompanying
text.
131. See generally Tax Compliance Act of 1982 and Related Legislation: Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) [hereinafter Tax Compliance Hearings) (committee press release describes proposed penalty as 'no fault penalty"

applying to "any underpayment arising from an undisclosed item"); cf. infra note 151 (discussing
implications of labeling penalty as "no fault").
132. H.R. 6300, § 503, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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low "reasonable basis" standard suggests movement toward a "quasicriminal" characterization of the proposed surcharge.'3
Statements of leading supporters of the proposals, in congressional
testimony, support a view of the penalty as predominantly a financial
disincentive. IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger told a subcommittee
of the Senate Finance Committee in March 1982 that "[w]e need to
further increase the risk to persons who are inclined to play [the 'audit
lottery']."11 Similarly, former IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz told
the House Ways and Means Committee in May 1982 that "our system
requires a penalty which will discourage taxpayers from entering into
tax-motivated transactions by providing a down-side risk."' The emphasis on the "risk" created by the proposed penalties does not necessarily indicate a penalty conforming to the benefit-charge model. Even
penalties which obviously establish absolute prohibitions, such as those
for murder and armed robbery, operate in part because of the "risk"
they pose for would-be offenders. Nevertheless, the imagery used by
Egger and Kurtz suggests that the proposed penalties were not designed to prohibit aggressive return positions absolutely, but rather
to limit them to more tolerable levels.
The Senate was the first house of Congress to approve a version
of what ultimately became section 6661. As reported by the Finance
Committee, the Senate bill would have imposed a penalty on all "substantial understatements" of liability, unless the taxpayer either believed that the position underlying the overstatement was "more likely
than not" to be sustained, or disclosed the position in the return.'3
The Finance Committee based its proposal on the observation that in
the absence of a penalty, taxpayers often were "not exposed to any
downside risk in taking highly questionable positions on their tax
returns .... ,,'7 This language, like that used by Commissioners Egger
and Kurtz in their testimony, supports the view that while questionable positions are undesirable, the proposed penalty was not intended
to establish an absolute normative proscription.
The use of a "more likely than not" standard also suggests that
the penalty envisioned by the Senate Finance Committee conformed
closely to the benefit-charge model. The high level of uncertainty in
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 130, at 36.
134. Compliance Gap: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Internal Revenue
Service of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1982) (statement of Roscoe
L. Egger, Jr.).
135. Tax Compliance Hearings, supra note 131, at 163 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
136. H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 341 (as reported by Senate Finance Committee
July 12, 1982).
137. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 272-73, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 781, 1019.
133.
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the tax law makes it difficult to interpret as normative a rule under
which a taxpayer may take a reporting position only with the belief
that it more likely than not is correct. This would not comport with
the principle, which seems well ingrained in our political culture, that
individuals are permitted to resolve bona fide doubts in their favor
when dealing with the government. There is, however, nothing anomalous in a "more likely than not" standard in connection with a penalty
of the benefit-charge variety. Under a benefit-charge approach, the
taxpayer is not prohibited from taking a position with less than a
fifty-percent chance of success. The taxpayer must, however, agree
behavior if
to bear the social costs inherent in aggressive reporting
138
incorrect.
be
to
shown
is
the position ultimately
The Senate, in a floor amendment offered by Senator Armstrong,
changed the "more likely than not" standard to "substantial authority."'13 9 Senator Armstrong described the new language explicitly as a
compromise between "reasonable basis" and '"more likely than not."'140
The Senate transmitted its bill to a House-Senate conference committee, which retained the "substantial authority" standard in the version
of the legislation presented to the House and Senate for final enactment.14 The conference committee explained the change from 'more
likely than not" to "substantial authority" with the observation that
'in some circumstances, tax advisors may be unable to reach [a] definitive . . . conclusion" whether a position is more likely than not to

prevail.'4 The conferees also indicated that the "substantial authority"
138. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
139. 128 CONG. REC. 17,220-27, 17,241-44 (1982). See generally Barker, supra note 81, at
19-37 to 19-38; Raby, supra note 128, at 64-67 (legislative background of "substantial authority"

requirement).
140.

128 CoNG. REC. at 17,224.

[Wihen I first considered this amendment, I had a little different set of words in
mind. I had the words reasonable grounds or reasonable basis. In other words, if

a reasonable man looking at the law, at the regulation, thought a particular tax
treatment made sense, that ought to be enough. I am persuaded out of deference
to those who claim that the present system is abused to go to the higher standard
of substantial authority. In other words, it cannot just look right, sound right, or
seem reasonable, but you have to be able to show that there is actually substantial
authority for the tax treatment you are claiming.
Id.
Senator Armstrong may have based the "substantial authority" standard on a proposal of
former IRS Commissioner Kurtz. See Tax Compliance Hearings, supra note 131, at 163-64.
H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 341 (as passed by Senate July 23, 1982); see 128 CONG. REC.
17,681 (1982) (the amended enacted version of H.R. 4961).
141. H.R. CONF. REP No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 574-76 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1346-48.
142. Id. at 575.
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standard was intended to remove from the coverage of the penalty
situations in which a taxpayer's "position is supported by present law
and may be taken with the good faith expectation that it reflects the
proper treatment of the item." 143 The penalty was to "assure that
taxpayers who take highly aggressive filing positions are penalized
while those who endeavor in good faith to fairly self-assess are not
penalized."'144 Both the weakening of the standard from "more likely
than not" to "substantial authority," and the introduction into the
committee report of the language concerning "good faith," support the
view that Congress intended to depart from a benefit-charge model
and establish a normatively binding standard inenacting section 6661.
On the other hand, in enacting section 6661 Congress did not take
other actions which it properly should have taken if the new penalty
had been intended to establish a quasi-criminal norm of behavior. Most
importantly, Congress did not change the "negligent or intentional
disregard" standard of the return preparer penalty under section
6694(a).145 The legislative history of and regulations under section
6694(a) make clear that the standard is to be identical to that of section
6653(a).146 If section 6661 established a new normative standard for
taxpayers, it would appear anomalous to continue to hold preparers
only to the "reasonable basis" standard of section 6653(a).147
The application of the "substantial authority" standard only to "substantial" understatements, which are. those exceeding the greater of
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 36.
147. In addition to I.R.C. § 6694(a), several provisions of the Code retain a "reasonable
basis" standard. I.R.C. § 6659, enacted in 1981 and amended in 1984, imposes penalties for
certain understatements of income tax resulting from overvaluations of property on which deductions are based, and I.R.C. § 6659A, enacted in 1986, imposes penalties for certain understatements of tax resulting from overstatements of pension obligations by employers. The amounts
of the penalties range from 10-30%, depending on the overstatement. I.R.C. §§ 6659(b) &
6659A(b). Under both provisions, the Treasury may waive the penalty "on a showing by the
taxpayer that there was a reasonable basis for the valuation . . . claimed on the return and
that such claim was made in good faith." I.R.C. §§ 6659(e) & 6659A(e).
Arguably, because questions of valuation and pension liability tend to involve issues that
are more factual than legal, a "substantial authority" standard would be difficult to apply in the
contexts of I.R.C. §§ 6659 & 6659A. Nevertheless, legal as well as factual questions do, on
occasion, arise in making valuations. See, e.g., Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d
1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983) (addressing whether estate was permitted to reduce value of stock
because of "blockage" - i.e., difficulty of marketing large block of stock). On balance, Congress's
retention of the "reasonable basis" standard in §§ 6659 & 6659A, even after it had enacted §
6661, gives some additional support to the view that "substantial authority" has not supplanted
"reasonable basis" as the basic normative standard governing return preparation.
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$5,000 or ten percent of the tax properly required to be shown on the
return, lends additional support to characterizing the section 6661
penalty as, at least in significant part, a benefit charge. There is
nothing inherently illogical in establishing a more demanding normative standard for larger tax payments. This might simply reflect a
legislative determination that when an item on a return involves a
potentially large understatement, the taxpayer has a normative obligation to make a more extensive inquiry into the proper treatment
of the item. 148 Nevertheless, Congress's use in section 6661 of a precise
cutoff point, at which a higher standard of compliance arises, seems
inconsistent with the principle that a person's normative social obligations should not vary according to the person's wealth. 49
If Congress had intended "substantial authority" to be a normatively binding standard, it could have established "substantial authority" as a standard for all tax understatements, with the provision that
the amount of liability be considered in determining whether the authority relied on by the taxpayer was "substantial." Alternatively, the
statute could have provided for a graduated penalty based on the
amount of liability involved. These or similar options would have enabled Congress, much less ambiguously, to establish "substantial authority" as a binding normative standard. The current statutory structure, in contrast, supports the view that the "reasonable basis" standard of section 6653(a) remains the normative standard for all taxpayers,
with section 6661 providing an additional financial disincentive for
wealthier taxpayers.
B.

Reactions of PractitionerGroups

The strongly negative reaction of practitioner groups to the notion
that section 6661 created a normative standard provides significant
although not conclusive support to characterization of the penalty as
a benefit charge. An early reaction to section 6661 came from a com-

148. In explaining the decision to limit application of its proposed penalty to "substantial"
understatements, the Senate Finance Committee said: 'The committee believes it is appropriate
to... exclude low and moderate income taxpayers from the scope of the penalty both because
of the greater access of higher income taxpayers to sophisticated tax advice and because these
taxpayers appear more often to play the audit lottery." S. REP. No. 494, supra note 137, at
273, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 781, 1020.
149. If the taxpayer's total tax liability is very large, the limitation of the penalty only to
"substantial" understatements can yield absurd results. Thus, if a taxpayer's proper total liability
is $10,000,000, the § 6661 penalty would apply only to understatements in excess of $1,000,000.
See IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal, supra note 6, at K-5 (reporting comments of Gregory
Nowak).
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mittee of the New York City Bar Association, which said in 1983:
"Congress has not mandated that substantial authority be adopted as
the standard for advising clients with respect to reporting positions
on tax returns. Section 6661 merely imposes a civil penalty on taxpayers in certain cases where there is neither substantial authority
nor disclosure." 15 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has said that while sanctions against practitioners properly
should involve some level of moral wrongdoing, section 6661 is a "nofault" penalty that "imposes a monetary penalty on the taxpayer.151
Similarly, the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association
has based its opposition to the Treasury's proposed disciplinary rules
in part on the view that section 6661 "does not require the personal
fault of the taxpayer," but instead "was enacted to provide an economic
deterrent to taxpayers playing the audit lottery.'152
These kinds of characterizations by practitioner groups cannot, of
course, in themselves establish section 6661 as a benefit-charge provision. The views of the professional associations may be colored, to
some extent, by a parochial interest in keeping disciplinary limitations
to a minimum. Nevertheless, perceptions of a penalty's normative
significance by those closely involved in compliance activity should
receive at least some weight in determining whether the penalty establishes a normative obligation.'3 On balance, the frequent statements
150.

Special Comm. of the N.Y. City Bar Ass'n on the Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice,

Ethics and the Tax Launjer, 38 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 218, 242 (1983), reprinted in 36 TAx
LAw. 865, 884 (1983).

151. Letter from Herbert L. Lerner & Leonard Podolin to Leslie S. Shapiro, Director of
Practice Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 13, 1987) (available on LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT
file).
The phrase "no-fault" can have several intended meanings, and characterization of a penalty
as "no-fault" does not preclude a determination that intentional violations of the penalty's standards will not violate a normative obligation. A penalty is a "no-fault" penalty if its imposition
is based on the presence or absence of objective factors - e.g., "substantial authority" for a
tax reporting position - rather than the subjective level of culpability of the violator (e.g.,
'negligence" or "recklessness"). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., Description of Tax Penalties 17 (1988) (discussion prepared in connection with hearings
by the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, held Mar. 31, 1988).
A penalty can be designed as a "no-fault" penalty simply to facilitate its enforcement, and this
need not imply that intentional violation of the no-fault penalty does not violate a normative
obligation. Nevertheless, the term "no-fault" might also be used, as by the AICPA in its
comments, to indicate a view that a particular penalty does not set forth a normative obligation.
152. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, supra note 86, at 1114-15.
153. Our society has no formal mechanism for determining the extent to which a particular
legislative enactment establishes a normative obligation. Indeed, if such a mechanism existed,
much of the normative ambiguity - and hence the special usefulness - of many civil penalties
would be lost. In the absence of a formal mechanism, it seems reasonable to assign some role
in the interpretive process to informed segments of the public, as well as legislative and administrative bodies such as the Congress and the Treasury.
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among practitioners that section 6661 does not create a normative
duty lend some (if limited) support to the conclusion that it does not.
C.

Taxpayer Ability to Avoid Penalty by Disclosure

The fact that the taxpayer can avoid the penalty under section
6661 by disclosing the existence of a questionable position on the
return may strengthen the argument that the penalty provision creates
a normative obligation. A primary reason for allowing taxpayers to
state aggressive return positions is to ensure the taxpayer the right
to challenge government interpretations of the tax laws - i.e., to
ensure the taxpayer a "day in court." If the taxpayer can avoid a
penalty through disclosure, the penalty should not seriously curtail
the taxpayer's right to challenge the government's legal interpretations
in court. Disclosure simply ensures that the government will have the
opportunity for its day in court. If the taxpayer's right to a "day in
court" were the only taxpayer interest involved in aggressive return
positions, there should be relatively little objection to assigning a high
level of normative force to the penalty under section 6661.
Even under this very basic analysis, however, there would need
to be some limitations on the demands of a normatively binding penalty
incorporating a disclosure option. It would, for example, be excessively
harsh to hold taxpayers to a normative obligation to disclose reporting
positions unless they are "more likely than not" to be correct. 1' Even
the best-informed taxpayer may be unable to determine with certainty
whether a proposed reporting position meets a "more likely than not"
standard. 15 Nevertheless, if the only interest involved were that of

154. It must be remembered that the current discussion only addresses the extent to which
it is proper for Congress to assert a normatively binding standard; i.e., a standard that taxpayers
have no legal right to violate (and in the violation of which they have no right to legal assistance),
even ifthey are willing to pay the applicable penalty. The current discussion is not intended
to suggest that Congress cannot properly impose a benefit-charge penalty for positions not
meeting a "more likely than not" standard, or some other relatively demanding standard. Such
a penalty would be designed to shift to the taxpayer the social costs of aggressive tax reporting,
while leaving to the taxpayer the decision whether to risk incurring the penalty.
155. Requiring disclosure of all positions that are not 'more likely than not" to be correct
would also raise serious practical difficulties for the IRS. Under this rule, such a high percentage
of returns would include disclosures that the disclosures probably would be of little use to
the Service in identifying returns with the greatest potential for "yield" on audit. Cf., e.g.,
LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, The Audit Lottery, and
Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 363,

385-86 (Jan. 31, 1983) (discussing practical limitations of disclosure requirements); 128 CONG.
REC. 17,222-226 (1982) (statements of Senators Armstrong & Grassley).
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protecting the taxpayer's right to a "day in court," it probably would
be appropriate to assign normative force to an obligation to disclose
positions without "substantial authority." Because only disclosure
would be required, the taxpayer's right to challenge the government's
positions would not be implicated.
Arguably, however, the taxpayer's entitlement to some degree of
aggressiveness in formulating return positions involves more than the
right to challenge the government's positions in court. The act of filing
a return also implicates the liberal society's traditional aversion to
requiring individuals to make negative reports of themselves to public
authorities, an aversion that probably stands at the center of legal
protections against "self-incrimination.' 1 This aversion is subject to
many limitations. Society obviously has the right in many instances
to require honest reports from individuals, even if those reports might
redound to the individual's detriment. Thus, for example, criminal
penalties for deliberate failure to file a tax return seem justified,
although filing a return typically involves a financial detriment to the
taxpayer. The courts have tended to apply the formal protections of
the fifth amendment rather sparingly, so that the taxpayer's formal
right to silence in the face of official inquiry is normally limited to
situations where the taxpayer faces an immediate threat of criminal
liability. 1 7 There certainly can be no immediate application of the fifth
amendment in the context of aggressive tax reporting, where only
potential civil liability is usually involved.
Nevertheless, the element of confession inherent in the "disclosure"
option under section 6661 should play at least some role in determining
the normative force of the penalty. Specifically, if a "substantial au-

156. Cf. Dolinko, Is There a Rationalefor the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1090-1107 (1986). Professor Dolinko's article reviews previous inquiries
into the sources of the fifth amendment protection. Dolinko questions whether any particular
social values, such as a social aversion toward legal requirements of self-disclosure, can suffce
to support absolute prohibitions against requiring self-disclosure in any law-enforcement context.
Id., passim. Nevertheless, Dolinko's analysis would not seem to argue against assigning some
importance to this value in public decision-making. Indeed, Dolinko himself indicates that while
absolute protections against requiring self-incrimination cannot be justified on purely theoretical
grounds, absolute protections might be required on practical grounds in some settings if the
social values underlying the fifth amendment right are to be accorded adequate protection. See
id. at 1142-48.
157. See, e.g., In re Crane Fulview Glass Door Co., 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9195
(N.D. Ill. 1959) (where government has abandoned criminal inquiry into taxpayer's affairs so
that only civil liability remains at stake, taxpayer has no privilege against disclosure). See
generally H. BALTER, TAX FRAuD AND EVASION

5.03(3)(b) (5th ed. 1983 & Supp. No. 2

(1987)).
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thority" standard would satisfactorily define the taxpayer's normative
obligation if all that were involved were the taxpayer's right to a "day
in court," then perhaps the taxpayer's normative obligation should be
lower if another legitimate taxpayer interest is added to the analysis.
Admittedly, all of this is somewhat speculative, as the current analysis
deals with values that are broadly conceived and not susceptible to
quantitative comparison. There seems little doubt, however, that significant social values exist that would limit the appropriate normative
force of penalties for aggressive reporting positions, even where the
penalties incorporate a disclosure option.
In sum, there are indications that section 6661 establishes a normatively binding standard for the taxpayer, and there are indications
that it does not. Probably the strongest evidence that it does is the
congressional use of the phrase "good faith," while the strongest argument for the opposite proposition is Congress' failure to change the
preparer penalty under section 6694. The normative significance of
section 6661 is uncertain - a result which is not surprising, in view
of our prior observation that the legislature's goals in enacting a civil
penalty are likely to be mixed.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 6661's NORMATIVE UNCERTAINTY

Stephen Pepper recently has provided a useful catalog of the social
values promoted by access to legal representation. 1 As a general
matter, the lawyer serves the function of empowering private persons
in their dealings with public institutions. This empowerment promotes
several fundamental social values. First, the lawyer promotes the
value of personal autonomy, by enabling the client to deal with the
public authorities on something approaching equal terms.15 9 The em-

158. Pepper, supra note 19, passim. Professor Pepper builds a model of the lawyer as
promoting the value of '"irst class citizenship." The particular use of the terms "autonomy" and
"equality," in the following discussion, is taken from Pepper's analysis.
159. Id. at 615-16. Subsumed within the value of "autonomy" promoted by access to counsel
is the psychological function performed by the lawyer in providing the client with a sense of
personal security in the face of an impersonal and perhaps hostile bureaucracy. Under this view,
the lawyer serves as the client's professional "friend." See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
MoralFundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); ef. Pepper, supra
note 125, at 665 n.35. The model of "lawyer as friend" has engendered controversy, because
some have read Professor Fried's statement of the model as incorporating some level of immunity
for the lawyer from normal moral constraints in performing services on behalf of clients. Cf.
Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer as Friend,86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977). The argument that the lawyer
should be subject to moral limitations in serving the client's interests is not, however, inconsistent
with the view of the lawyer as protecting the personal dignity of the client by providing the
client with a professional 'riend" who has a particularized interest in the client's well-being.
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powerment provided by the lawyer also promotes the social value of
equality. 160 Persons involved in disputes with the public authority have
widely varying levels of skill in dealing with public institutions.161 It

would offend prevailing principles of equality to let these differences
in ability determine a person's fundamental rights and entitlements.
The values of autonomy and equality are central political values,
and the role of access to counsel in promoting them is symbolic as
well as functional. The ability of the lawyer to assist the citizen in all
legally permissible activities should not be compromised without compelling reasons.
This presumption in favor of access to counsel is the basis of the
decision of the drafters of the Model Rules to prohibit assistance only
in a client's "crime or fraud" - a rule which should be read to prohibit
lawyer assistance in violating civil penalty provisions only where the
penalties conform fairly closely to the quasi-criminal model. At the
present time, the section 6661 penalty occupies what can best be
described as an intermediate point on the spectrum between the quasicriminal and benefit-charge models. While there certainly is some
moral opprobrium involved in violating the section 6661 standard,
there are also indications that, in the view of Congress and others
involved directly in tax compliance, the taxpayer retains the ultimate
decision whether to violate the standard in return for bearing the risk
that the penalty will be imposed.
It might be objected that this conclusion does not give sufficient
deference to the Treasury's role in establishing whether a penalty
standard sets forth a normative obligation. Our system does not formally assign responsibility for establishing normative standards to any
one social institution, and in practice the legislature, the courts, administrative bodies, and the public all contribute to perceptions that
a given rule does, or does not, create a normative obligation. There
is nothing intrinsically inappropriate in the Treasury Department seek-

160.
161.

Pepper, supra note 19, at 618-19.
The extent to which access to counsel promotes the value of equality is limited by the

fact that legal services must, as a general matter, be purchased. In a society with both a market
allocation of legal services and substantial disparities of wealth, legal assistance may serve as

a highly imperfect leveler. The consequences of this may be magnified in the context of taxation,
because perceptions that the wealthy have special access to tax advice can erode public support

for the tax system generally. Despite this difficulty, however, it would seem that society should
be reluctant to deny access to counsel where clients seek to engage in activities that arguably

are legally permissible. The proper approach to injustices in the distribution of legal services
should be to address the distributional inequities directly, rather than to compromise the institution of legal representation itself. Id. at 619-21.
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ing to establish higher standards of tax compliance by regulation.
Arguably, it is within the Treasury's proper social role to promote
the view, through amendments to Circular 230, that section 6661 does
establish a normative requirement and that practitioners therefore are
not free to assist in positions that would incur the penalty.
This would be appropriate, however, only if the Treasury could be
reasonably assured that its action would succeed in bringing about a
consensus concerning the civil penalty's normative force. Otherwise,
the Treasury would be left with a regulation that prohibited legal
assistance in conduct in which the taxpayer remains free to engage.
It is not enough that social perceptions be in the process of evolving
toward moral condemnation of the activity. The perception of moral
opprobrium should already be fairly well established before practitioner assistance is proscribed. 16
This limitation on the Treasury's use of practitioner discipline in
seeking to elevate norms of taxpayer compliance does not mean that
practitioner discipline has no important role in enforcing norms of taxpaying behavior that already have been established. Indeed, the next
section of this article suggest ways of making the Treasury's regulation
of practitioners more effective. In fashioning a role for the Treasury,
however, it is important to recognize the parameters within which
that role can be implemented most effectively and appropriately. The
primary limitation is the need to base standards of practitioner discipline on standards of taxpayer compliance that already have attained
a high level of normative force. Once these standards have been identified, the Treasury can have a significant role in promoting a high
level of practitioner -

VII.

and thus, indirectly, taxpayer -

compliance.

SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN TREASURY'S
DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS

A. Introduction
The preceding analysis concludes that the Treasury should base
its standards for practitioners on the penalty provisions applicable to
taxpayers, but that the particular standard proposed by the Treasury
in its August 1986 proposal - a standard based on section 6661 would prevent practitioners from assisting clients in positions that
they are at least arguably entitled to take. 16 This suggests that, at
least as an interim measure, the Treasury should base its disciplinary
162. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
163. This conclusion is, obviously, to some extent subjective. Several commentators have
supported the Treasury's proposed standard, based on the view that § 6661 does establish the
bounds of permissible taxpayer behavior. Graetz, Too Little, Too Late, TAX TIMES 17 (Feb.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 2

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

standard on the Code's next most demanding penalty provision, the
"negligence or intentional disregard" penalty of section 6653(a), which
does impose a normative obligation on taxpayers.
This conclusion may be disappointing to some, including this author,
who believe that the "reasonable basis" standard with which section
6653(a) has been identified, based as it is on an inappropriate analogy
between tax returns and statements in adversarial proceedings, imposes too low a normative obligation on taxpayers. The following discussion thus considers not only the utility of disciplinary rules based
on section 6653(a) as currently interpreted, but also explores the possibility that the standard under section 6653(a) might be strengthened
by administrative or legislative action.
B.

Usefulness of a Standard Based on Section 6653(a)

Despite the minimal demands that section 6653(a) imposes on taxpayers, a disciplinary standard based even on this provision would
give the Treasury a greater ability to respond to inappropriate practitioner behavior than it has under current law. The Treasury presently has no explicit authorization in its regulations to discipline practitioners for participating in unsupported return positions. 164 As a result, enforcement of the "reasonable basis" standard, and its successor
and close relative, the "some realistic possibility of success" standard,
has been left largely to the state bar regulatory authorities, who

1987); Johnson, supra note 26, passim; Letter from Bernard Wolfman to Leslie S. Shapiro (Feb.
9, 1987), reprintedin 34 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTs) 832 (Feb. 23, 1987). Differences concerning the normative characterization of § 6661 do not, of course, reflect on the centrality of this
characterization in evaluating the Treasury's proposals.
164. At least arguably, the Treasury's authority to discipline practitioners for behavior that
is "disreputable" (see supranote 80) grants the Director of Practice authority to impose sanctions
for egregiously insupportable return positions, and under current procedures the IRS instructs
its field officers to refer to the Director of Practice instances in which practitioner advice
apparently has contributed to the imposition of civil penalties, including the penalty under §
6661. IRS MANUAL § 4297.9 (1986) and id. § 4563.62 (1987); see generally Shapiro, Professional
Responsibility in the Eyes of the IRS, 17 TAx ADVISER 136, 141-42 (1986). In the absence of
specific implementing regulations, however, the vague standard of "disreputable" behavior provides an uncertain basis for discipline in all but the most extreme cases.
Under § 7407 of the Code, the government can seek an injunction against a tax return
preparer who has "engaged in any conduct subject to penalty under section 6694... ," prohibiting
the preparer from continuing to engage in such activity. I.R.C. § 7407(b)(1)(A). This power
gives the Treasury some ability to control return preparation advice not meeting a "reasonable
basis" standard. Section 7407, however, does not impose financial or other sanctions against
offending preparers, and requires the government to avail itself of cumbersome judicial procedures. It seems a poor substitute for effective Treasury disciplinary regulations.
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probably do not have the specialized expertise to discipline practitioners. Indeed, since the ABA's promulgation of Formal Opinion 314 in
1965, there apparently have been no state disciplinary actions grounded
on the "reasonable basis" standard. 16 A Treasury disciplinary system
based even on an excessively lenient standard should have greater
influence than a virtual absence of regulation.
As a practical matter, a standard based on section 6653(a) probably
would result in about the same pattern of enforcement as a standard
based on section 6661. Given its limited resources, the Office of the
Director of Practice of the IRS probably will be able to institute
proceedings only against the most egregious forms of professional
misconduct, regardless of the formal extent of its authority. To merit
the serious attention of the Director of Practice, misconduct probably
would have to violate the "negligence or disregard" standard of section
6653(a), as well as the "substantial authority" standard of section 6661.
C. Strengthening the Section 6653(a) Standard
Even when viewed in the most positive light, a disciplinary standard based on section 6653(a), as that provision has been interpreted
to date, suggests a limited role for practitioner regulation in efforts
to control taxpayer noncompliance. Some social benefit might be
achieved if the standard under section 6653(a) could be strengthened
administratively or legislatively, without raising the standard to such
an extent as to call into question the identification of the standard
with the taxpayer's clear normative obligations.les
Legislatively, the standard could be raised in several ways. First,
Congress could eliminate section 6653(a) entirely 167 and amend section
6661 so that the "substantial authority" standard applies to all understatements, not only to "substantial" understatements. An amended
section 6661 could address the special problems posed by relatively
small understatements either by taking the size of an understatement

165. Cf. Holden, supra note 48, at 235.
166. As of this writing, groups within both the Treasury and the Congress are studying
the structure of penalties in the Code with a view toward revision. See generally Jones, Civil
Tax PenaltiesAttracting Lawmakiers' Attention, 38 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1019 (Mar.
7, 1988); cf. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 151; NYSBA Section of
Taxation on Civil Penalties, 38 TAx NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 511 (Feb. 1, 1988).
167. Even if the current '"negligence or disregard" penalty is eliminated as it applies to
aggressive return positions, Congress might want to retain the "negligence" portion of the
penalty as it applies to negligent errors in record-keeping. See supra note 110.
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into account in determining whether the penalty should be waived, or
by providing a "sliding scale" penalty schedule. 16 Additionally, Congress could incorporate the "substantial authority" standard into the
preparer penalty under section 6694(a). These actions would by implication establish "substantial authority" as the basic normative standard
governing tax reporting.
Of course, there is no reason to believe that legislative action
establishing "substantial authority" as a generally applicable normative
standard is any more likely today than it was in 1982. Even if such
a standard could be enacted, moreover, there would be a strong possibility that it would so exceed generally held notions of acceptable
1
taxpayer behavior that it would quickly be eroded in application.

69

If

this were to occur, the net result would be a single weak standard
replacing the current combination of two standards, one of which is
relatively weak but sets forth a normative obligation, and the other
of which is more demanding and is enforced by a penalty conforming
largely to the "benefit-charge" model. The net result of the loss of
the current 'two-tier" structure might therefore provide less, not
more, deterrence of questionable positions. 10 A better approach might

168. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. In amending § 6661, Congress also might
respond to the concerns raised by practitioners that the Treasury's current definition of "authority" for purposes of § 6661 is excessively narrow. Cf. generallysupranotes 49-51 and accompanying text (describing difficulties in defining "substantial authority," especially with respect to
significance of IRS letter rulings), Letter from Bernard Wolfman to Leslie S. Shapiro, supra
note 163, at 834.
169. Rossi & Grasmick, Appeals Within OurSocial Structure That Can Enhance Voluntary
Compliance, in 1 CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH 79, 92 (Conference
sponsored by IRS Ass't Comm'r for Planning, Finance & Research, Jan. 1985).
If [a] legally prescribed sanction exceeds what is generally considered to be fair,
then the likelihood of any sanction being imposed might be reduced. This tendency,
referred to as the neutralization of severe sanctions, has been observed in attempts
to reduce drunken driving and in the tax administrations of some European countries. When the penalty is perceived as excessive, social control agents are less
likely to make an arrest, prosecutors and judges are more likely to accept plea
bargaining, and juries are less likely to convict.
Id. (citations omitted). See also B. Bittker, Professional Responsibility and Federal Tax Practice
(Ford Distinguished Lecture Delivered at New York University, 1965) 24 ("When they demand
too much, legal and ethical systems fall of their own weight in practice, even though they may
linger on to be invoked on ceremonial occasions."); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 151, at 22-23 ("The sheer size of a penalty may limit its effectiveness.... Once
taxpayers recognize that the Government is unwilling to impose certain harsh penalties, a
smaller, more enforceable, penalty might provide a greater deterrent effect.").
170. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that the § 6661 penalty does not set forth a clear
normative obligation that gives the penalty much of its utility. The use of two penalties, only
one of which clearly sets forth a morally binding obligation, can give the public authority much
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be to retain the current, partially nonnormative penalty under section
6661, while at the same time modestly raising the "normative" stand-

ard under section 6653(a).
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress probably gave the Treasury the authority needed to elevate the standard under section 6653(a)

without further legislative action. First, in an attempt to render the
language of section 6653(a) "clearer and more comprehensible," Congress changed the standard for imposition of the section 6653(a) penalty
from "negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations (but

without intent to defraud)" to simply "negligence or disregard of rules
or regulations."''1 Congress also added to section 6653 definitions of

"negligence" and "disregard."'1 Section 6653(a)(3) now provides that
'the term 'negligence' includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title, and the term 'disregard' includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." Both

greater flexibility in deterring undesired behavior. Because the penalty with the more demanding
standard does not carry with it a high level of moral stigma, the public authority is free to
enforce it more aggressively. This effect is a manifestation of the principle, developed above,
that a well-ordered tax enforcement system is likely to incorporate at least one penalty that
conforms largely to the benefit-charge model.
171. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1503(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2742, amending I.R.C. § 6653(a)(1)
(1986). Both the House and Senate committee reports to the 1986 Act state that the Act
"generally redrafts the negligence penalty to make it dearer and more comprehensible." H.
REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 834 (1985); S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 181
(1986). See also infra note 173.
The elimination of the phrase "without intent to defraud" apparently was intended to complement changes made to the fraud penalty under § 6653(b), in order to encourage enforcement
authorities to apply the penalty more aggressively. Prior to the 1986 Act, the penalty under §
6653(a) applied to the entire amount of an understatement if any portion was attributable to
'negligence or intentional disregard," and the penalty under § 6653(b) applied to the entire
amount of an understatement if any portion was attributable to fraud. In effect, these rules
required IRS personnel to choose between applying either the 'negligence or intentional disregard" penalty or the "fraud" penalty to the entire amount of an understatement,-a choice that
often resulted in application of the less severe "negligence or intentional disregard" penalty.
Under changes introduced in 1986, the Service may apply the fraud penalty to the particular
portion of an underpayment that is attributable to fraud, and may apply the 'negligence or
disregard" penalty to the remainder of the underpayment. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1503(a),
amending I.R.C. §8 6653(a)(2), 6653(b)(2). Congress effected these changes in the hope that it
would enhance the Service's flexibility in applying the fraud penalty, thereby, increasing the
Service's willingness to impose it. Except to the extent that the fraud penalty applies, the
penalty under § 6653(a) continues to apply to the entire amount of an underpayment, if any
portion of the underpayment is attributable to '"negligence or disregard." I.R.C. §§ 6653(a)(1),
6653(a)(2). See generally H. REP. No. 426, supra, at 833-36; S.REP. No. 313, supra, at 179-83;
Garbis & Fisher, supra note 101, at 490-93.
172. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1503(a), 100 Stat. 2085,2742, amending I.R.C. § 6653(a)(1) (1986).
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the House and Senate committee reports to the 1986 Act set forth
the view "that the negligence and fraud penalties have not been applied
in a large number of cases where their application is fully justified,"
and the reports invite the Service and the courts to apply the section
6653 penalties more aggressively. 17
To strengthen section 6653(a) administratively, the Treasury should
consider issuing a revised regulation stating that the "negligence or
disregard" standard will be interpreted less stringently than a "substantial authority" standard, but more stringently than a "reasonable
basis" standard. The Treasury also would make conforming amendments to the regulations interpreting the meaning of "negligent or
intentional disregard of rules or regulations" under section 6694(a)
governing preparers, and would amend Circular 230 to apply the newly
interpreted standard to practitioners.
The envisioned standard, falling between "reasonable basis" and
"substantial authority," probably conforms closely to many tax practitioners' conceptions of the "some realistic possibility of success"
standard under Formal Opinion 85-352.174 Indeed, the Treasury's regulations might state explicitly that to avoid the "negligence or disregard penalty" a position would require a realistic possibility of success
if contested by the Service. Admittedly, this poses the danger of
weakening the Treasury's standard, if the view that Formal Opinion
85-352 sets forth only a "reasonable basis" standard becomes dominant.
It is also possible, however, that by incorporating the "realistic possibility of success" language in its regulations, and enforcing the section
6653(a) penalty more vigorously as directed by Congress, the Treasury
would strengthen the standard not only under section 6653(a) but also
under Formal Opinion 85-352. The net result would be a uniform
standard, more stringent than "reasonable basis" but less stringent
than "substantial authority," which would govern taxpayers under

173. Both reports state:
The committee is concerned that the negligence and fraud penalties have not
been applied in a large number of cases where their application is fully justified.
The committee has consequently modified several aspects of these penalties in
order to improve their operation. In addition, however, the committee emphasizes
that the IRS and the courts share significant responsibility to ensure that these
penalties are fully asserted in appropriate instances.
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1985, H. REP. No. 426, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 834 (1985); SENATE COMMITrEE ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986,
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE,

S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1986).
174. This view is not universal. Many practitioners probably view "some realistic possibility
of success" as establishing a standard virtually identical to "reasonable basis." See supra notes
71-72 and accompanying text; see also infra text immediately following this note.
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section 6653(a), return preparers under section 6694(a), and practitioners under both Circular 230 and Formal Opinion 85-352.17 This should
unambiguously set both the taxpayer's and the professional's normative obligations at a level more demanding than that applying to the
statement of positions in litigation, but not so demanding as to weaken
the perception of section 6653(a) as establishing a normatively binding
obligation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This article's analysis of the obligations of tax practitioners began
with a discussion of the taxpayer's obligations under the penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The discussion concluded that
the standard set forth under one of the penalty provisions, the 'negligence or disregard" standard of section 6653(a), unmistakably defines
a normative obligation of the taxpayer. The lawyer, therefore, should
be prohibited from assisting clients in taking positions that would
violate the standard. The normative status of the Code's more demanding standard of section 6661, which sometimes requires a position to
be supported by "substantial authority," is less certain.
While there are indications that Congress designed the standard
of section 6661 to apply sanctions for behavior it considered morally
objectionable, there also are indications that Congress intended to
leave to the taxpayer the ultimate decision whether to comply with
the standard. This uncertainty concerning the extent of the taxpayer's
normative obligations creates uncertainty concerning the practitioner's
obligations. This article concludes that in view of the social benefits
associated with access to professional advice, the uncertainty should
be resolved by allowing lawyers to assist clients in taking positions
that might subject the client to the section 6661 penalty.
This leads to a somewhat unsatisfactory situation, because it effectively limits the Treasury's disciplinary standard to that of section
6653(a), which almost certainly places too low a normative obligation

175. Both the ABA Tax Section and the AICPA, in their public comments on the Treasury's
proposed amendments to Circular 230, have proposed that the Treasury adopt "some realistic
possibility of success" as a disciplinary standard. Letter from David Sachs to Leslie S. Shapiro,
Director of Practice, Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 9, 1987) (available on LEXIS, Fedtax
library, TNT file) (setting forth ABA Tax Section comments); Letter from Herbert L. Lerner
& Leonard Podolin to Leslie S. Shapiro, supranote 151. The ABA Tax Section and the AIGPA
thus would reach a result similar to that suggested here. The current analysis supports adoption
of "some realistic possibility of success" as a disciplinary standard only if the Treasury simultaneously makes clear that the standard is to be more demanding than "reasonable basis."
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on taxpayers. This article therefore suggests that the Treasury use
authority implicitly granted to it in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to
strengthen the standard under section 6653(a). This action would, in
turn, permit the Treasury to strengthen the disciplinary rules governing practitioners.
A final observation is in order which extends beyond the confines
of tax practice. In the past, analysis of the lawyer's professional obligations has been impeded by a tendency to assume that questions
concerning the client's normative obligations have clear answers. In
a legal system in which "hybrid" civil penalties are common, however,
these answers are not likely to be forthcoming. A helpful analytical
approach to defining the lawyer's obligations is to weigh the extent
to which the lawmaking authority intended to create a normative
obligation in establishing a penalty against the social harm that might
be caused by restricting access to counsel. While the resulting judgment unavoidably will be somewhat arbitrary, a recognition of the
balancing process that is involved should clarify future debates over
the lawyer's obligations, in widely varying settings.
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